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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

Implementation of The Safety Management System for
Domestic Fleet In Myanmar (DSM)

Degree:

Master of Science

This dissertation is a study of the analysis of the accident investigation and
implementation process for domestic safety management in Myanmar. It analyzes
previous accidents, including origins, consequences, and investigation, as well as any
lessons learned. Afeter analyzing with twenty investigation reports, interviewed with
stakeholders who are those from administration, ship owner association, dockyards
and insurance company. For getting the clear picture of hidden key points for the
study, details discussion has been carried out about five times together with ship
owner ,supveyors and investigators. The prime focus remained at Myanmar's water
transportation network's history and contemporary operating systems, including
vessels, operators, supervisory bodies, and all other stakeholders. Myanmar has a
1300-mile Coastline and a 2000-mile network of inland navigable rivers. Ayeyarwady
and Chindwin are the two main rivers. The Chindwin is navigable for around 730
kilometers when combined with the Ayeyarwady. Noteably, number of domestic
vessel accidents have occurred in the country because of contributing factors and,
consequently, lead to massive loss of human life, environment and the property. The
study has been conducted by using the Human Factor Analysis ans Classification
System (HFACS). This study identified 348 casualty factors moreover,the finding of
the has been also validated by conducting the five interview of the stakeholders from
the domestic shipping industry. The study presents all stakeholders a greater
knowledge of domestic safety and how the human factor plays a role in unsafe
conditions. Similiarly, it is expected that this study will be helpful towards the improving
the regular safety inspections and audits of Domestic Safety Management (DSM),
eventually leading to the era of zero fatalities.

KEYWORDS: DSM, HFACS, Stakeholders.
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Chapter One

1.1

Introduction

Maritime transport is a critical component of all of the countries' economic and social
growth. Sea transport carries about 80% of global trade volume and over 70% of
global trade value (UNCTAD,2018). In most developing countries, these percentages
are much higher. Maritime transport in the Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (ESCAP) region proliferated in the 2000s and is expected to expand
even further in the future, as the rapid growth in maritime transport is linked to the
region's economic growth (UNESCAP,2016). However, the shipping industry faces
various challenges that characterize safety and maritime incidents because a ship
causes harm to its environment. Accidents are caused by a sequence of interactions
rather than a single act or occurrence. However, human factors account over 58% of
maritime claims, while mechanical failures (machines) and natural hazards account
for the remaining percent (MCA,2010). Human factors significantly affect all
processes, and although human errors cannot be avoided, their impact can be
mitigated by introducing additional mitigation techniques. Because, ships are
designed, built, owned, crewed, maintained, repaired, and salvaged by people.
When things go wrong, People regulate them, survey them, underwrite them and
investigate them (MCA,2010). As a result, most international safety regulations
focused on people systems aim to minimize human error and harmonize emerging
technologies known as "human-machine interfaces" to improve safety and harmonize
new technologies. The human factor will help identify gaps and vulnerabilities in the
interaction between shipboard crew and equipment in the maritime industry. The
International

Maritime

Organization

(IMO)

states

that

"humans

are

non-

programmable; as a result, considerations to be studied are what elements are, what
will be created, and the limits of humankind". To reduce human-related incidents in
the shipping industry, the IMO adopted the International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) and the International
Safety Management Code (ISM). Presently, IMO is inprocess for drafting the model
regulation for the domestic ferry safety (MSC-103/8).
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Furthermore, incident investigation reports and data collection for casualties from
member states within their sovereign is not transparent due to national interest. Small
boats and non-convention vessels operating on domestic voyages fall outside the
sphere of IMO's activities. Additionally, domestic vessels in Myanmar were aged,
and most passenger-cum-cargo barges were below 100 tons. The fleet was poorly
maintained and repaired, had limited-service capacity, and had a weak safety record
by most standards. Per year, on average, ten boats sunk in the 1980s (ESCAP,2016).

1.2

Background Information

Myanmar, a developing country, will need to continue reforms and structural
transformations to realize its high growth potential, especially in terms of major
infrastructure projects, developing relevant capacities and skills, and improving the
business situation. Myanmar will be able to enter the upper-middle-income economies
by 2030 as a result of this (National Logistics Master Plan, 2018). However, Myanmar
infrastructure lags behind its Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN)
neighbors, making it complex to access markets and social services. Moreover,
poverty and geographic deprivation are heightened by high transportation costs and
restricted access to markets and services (Baird, N.W, 2018). To serve the country's
major transportation corridors, Myanmar has a comprehensive domestic vessel
transport network that is well configured, including the Yangon-Mandalay route.

2

Figure 1- 1: Location of Inland Waterway.

Source: National Logistic Master Plan 2018- 2030.

Myanmar has a coastline of 1300 miles and inland navigational waterways that is
2000 miles long (NDC, 2020). There are two main rivers illustrates in the figure 1-1 ,
Ayeyarwady (No.1) and Chindwin (No.3), sailing restriction during Summer due to C
(DWIR,2020). The Ayeyarwady is navigable all year up to Bhamo and during the dry
season up to Myitkyina. However, rapids on the distance of the channel between
Bhamo and Myitkyina make navigation dangerous during the rainy season. From its
combination with the Ayeyarwady, the Chindwin is navigable for around 730
kilometers. Many streams in the Ayeyarwady Delta are navigable and interconnect
with a network of canals. Twenty million of the population in villages and limited
access to all-season roads (ADB, 2016).
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1.3

Identifying What Safety Problems Exist

Figure 1- 2: Comparison for Number of Death and Injury between ESCAP Countries.

Source: UNESCAP 2016.

There is a significant difference in the number of casualties reported by countries
responding. Figure 1-2 reveals that the Philippines, Bangladesh, the Republic of
Korea, and Myanmar have more losses than others. On the other hand, other
countries lack sufficient mechanisms to collect and manage casualty statistics
(UNESCAP,2016). According to Dr Hebber's (2020), the main problems which
threaten the maritime safety of the domestic fleet are "overloading and overcrowding,
pre-departure safety education, crew training for emergency scenarios and effective
search & rescue efforts to alleviate fatal consequences”. In addition, human factors
are complex systems and errors affected by incompetence, overconfidence,
carelessness, negligence, drinking, drowsiness, and fatigue.
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1.4

History of Maritime Accidents in Myanmar

Table 1- 1: The trend of Maritime Accidents.

Source: The Study on Improving Maritime Transport Safety in the ESCAP Region –
2016.
According to UNESCAP, 2016 publication, “The analysis on ship accident rate based
on the number of ships that were in accidents and the total number of ships operated
for the past five years based on the data submitted by eight countries showed that the
rate is 3.2 percent on average". Accidents happened in Myanmar may seems to be
nose down from 2011 to 2015 by the submitted result. However, apart of the ESCAP
report , rate of casuality rose again after 2015 and this study will hightlight in chapter
3.5. In Myanmar, where many people depend on overcrowded and dilapidated boats
for transportation, marine accidents are frequent. For example, seventy-seven people
died due to Aung Ta Gun (3), a government-owned Passenger vessel sunk in March
2015 near Naung Taw Gyi island, Rakhine state; consequently, 77 people died.
Moreover, the Domestic ferry, Aung Soe Moe Kyaw, which has been carrying around
300 passengers and sank due to overloaded and overcrowded during the lighting
festival, a prominent Buddhist religious event in 2016 near Sagaing in Chindwin River;
as a result, 72 people died (The Maritime Executive). After the accident investigation
process, Myanmar Authorities decided to establish Chindwin standards, especially for
the ferry, which vessels are operating in the Chindwin River (Upper Myanmar). The
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third major maritime accident in Myanmar happened in 2017; a wooden boat carrying
about 60 wedding guests collided with a container ship and sunk in Pathein,
southwestern Myanmar, killing 20 people and leaving another dozen missing
(Reuters,2017).
Figure 1- 3: Photos of domestic vessel accident in Myanmar.

Flooding (unregistered inland vessel)

Collision (Coastal Tanker, MYAN AUNG)
)

Collision (Tug, Zwe Myint Myat Tun 3 )

Capsizing (Ferry, Aung Soe Moe Kyaw 2)

Source: News and Journal
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1.5

Aims and Objectives

The study aims to effectively implement the DSM system and minimize human-related
accidents for all domestic vessels. The DSM framework's efficient outcome protects
and prevents poor, un-educated ship drivers and passengers from such causalities.
The objectives of this research are to ensure a cost-effective and straightforward
means of:
(a) Ensuring safety for all domestic vessels;
(b) Preventing human injury and loss of life;
(c) Prevention of pollution along the river and coastal area;
(d) Complying with applicable regulations, rules, standards, and procedures; and
(e) Smooth operation for all governing bodies.
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Chapter Two
2.1

Literature Review

There are two main rivers, Ayarwaddy and Chindwin, sailing restriction during
Summer due to limited draft about one to two meters (DWIR,2020). As a result, oil
and cargo barges frequently ground, threatening along river banks due to severe
pollution. Additionally, the other challenges are strength and stability criteria to reduce
light ship weight related to upper Myanmar's draft limit, which negatively impacts ferry
safety. Fishing and ferry are the majority fleet of accidents within ten years in
Myanmar, which relate to Collision, Flooding, Capsizing, and Fire. The highlights of
most accident cases are related to human factors, which rely on stakeholders'
knowledge and participation in marine safety awareness training programs and
information sharing activities. Myanmar society has been dominated by a culture of
pursuit of economic expansion. Safety has been ignored too much for too long.
Therefore, promoting a "culture of safety first" mentality is critical to avoid future
marine disasters.
Implementation of international and national maritime safety standards and
regulations through national law and maritime policies is a vital role of maritime
administration to improve maritime activity safety and efficiency. This study uses the
IMO Goal Base Standards safety level approach method (MSC.1/ Circ.1596).
Implementation framework aligns with the outcome of accident investigation reports
and which analysized with HFACS method. There are five layers that correspond to
the main principles of HFACS, Reason's Swiss Cheese Model, and Hawkins' SHEL
model (Chen et al., 2013). According to Chen et al., 2013, “The suggested technique
is demonstrated through a case study of the Herald of Free Enterprise catastrophe,
which illustrates how the integration of analysis findings as a supplement to the
HFACS analytical data may provide a full understanding of the event”. However, much
of accident reports shall be taken to achieving more strengthing of paradigm. Before
taking place the implementation process, analyze the gaps between system
requirements and performance limitations of stakeholders by collecting data and
analyzing this data with qualitative for HFACS methodology and interview questions
and quantitative methods for summarizing accident records between 2010 to
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2020.Then, the implementation of requirements is given to the competent authority,
DMA, supporting, among other things, indigenous solutions that are low-cost but fit
for purpose (MSC 103/8 draft ). Moreover, DMA ensures that suitable occupational
health and safety procedures are onshore and onboard, focusing on newly emerging
health and safety problems. The administration shall conduct inspections, testing, and
surveys, with the person acting the functional title and contact information clearly and
legibly indicated on the certificate. The DSM manual clearly defines the policy for
safety and environmental protection and documentation process. Moreover,
effectively implement by setting with specific principles, establish framework and
processing recording and reporting system. According to Maritime Coast Guard
Agency (MCA,2015), the following chapters are to include within domestic safety
management system: General; Objectives; Policy; Vessel safety standards; Area of
trading zones; Monitoring system; Duties and Responsibilities; Designated Person;
Knowledge sharing and Training; Procedure for safe operation; Procedure for
reporting Accidents; Procedure for responding and preparation for Emergencies;
Equipment; Review; Certification; Exemption. However, the implementation process
shall meet with the actual situation and harmonized with Myanmar safety culture for
effective outcomes. Therefore, chapter six of this study may provide with
implementation framework by modification of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO 31000,2018).
According to UNCLOS, article 91, "Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of
its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly
its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly”.
Myanmar is an IMO member state since 1945 and party to different IMO instruments.
Therefore, this research shall provide with contributing factors of accidents which
taken from HFACS method and interview questions to establish policy and procedure
by emphasizing the safety standards for the Domestic fleet to prevent any loss of life
and pollution from Myanmar flagged ships. To reduce and minimize accidents, all
stakeholders involved in Domestic shipping may take steps to maintain, preserve, and
promote traditional craft and transportation development and construction in domestic
waterways (MSC 103/8).
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2.2

Research Questions

To achieve the objectives, the following research questions guided the study:
(1) How to apply the HFACS Taxonomy for accident investigation of Myanmar
domestic vessels?
(2) How to reduce or eliminate the significant contributing factors of accidents?
(3) How to solve problem statements regarding legal and economic sector?
(4) What could be the initiatives of relevant stakeholders to ensure and maintain
Myanmar domestic vessel safety?

2.3

Research Methods

2.3.1

Data Collection Methods

Data collection for this study will be based on primary and secondary data sources.
The preliminary data taken from internal administrative documents, accident
investigation reports and survey records, stakeholders` Interview records, and
secondary data will be achieved from relevant websites, reports, training materials,
dissertations of previous students. Furthermore, lectures by both visiting experts and
WMU professors certainly contribute to this work.

10

2.3.2

Data Analysis Process

Figure 2- 1: Process of data analysis.

Source: Author

The analysis procedure is divided into two stages: (a) general analysis from annual
records and (b) details analysis for specific investigation reports by human factors
classification system. These stages align with interview questions to get a clear
picture of contributing factors for domestic vessel accidents, as shown in the above
diagram. For analyzing data, apply with HFACS taxonomy for primary data is taken
from administrative accidents records and interviews with stakeholders related to the
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quantitative and qualitative (mixed) method. For general analysis, extraction of data
from annual accident records between 2010 to 2020 which control by legal
department of DMA. For detail analysis, apply with HFACS to investigation reports
and factors extracts from it. Finally, supported the implementation section which part
of implementation process by mixing with general records, details (HFACS) and key
points from interviewing the stakeholders.

2.4

Expected Results

This dissertation aims to examine accidents that happened between 2010 to 2020 for
general analysis and some selected typical accidents that have occurred in Myanmar
using the HFACS – MSS framework and taxonomy, as well as to implement an
effective safety management system for the domestic fleet. The purpose of this
dissertation is to examine with the HFACS – MSS framework for some selected typical
incidents that have occurred in Myanmar in the past and to minimize accidents and
causalities in Myanmar Domestic shipping. The expectation for this study is to achieve
an applicable safety management system for domestic fleets which aligns with
Myanmar cultural, economic, and educational background. Additionally, the practical
outcomes may achieve from theoretical basics to initiate effective frameworks. The
finality of research is enhancing the safety culture for all concerning those who
perform in the Domestic fleet and changing their mindset by providing DSM system
with a less documented control system.

2.5

Limitations

This research is aimed at enlargement focusing the ferry safety and other domestic
vessel safety standards and procedures. However, conflict of interest and poor cooperation challenges the capacity building for all stakeholders and data collection
from other sources due to poor co-operation. The majority of the challenge for this
study is political instability during research which reflects in data collection and
interviews due to restriction of social network application.

12

Chapter Three

3.1

Problem definition

In recent years, analysis of shipping incidents has increased concerns about the
critical role of the human factor. The loss of life, the effect on company income and
reputation, and the significant environmental damage that a shipwreck can cause are
all clear and present risks. There is a clear link between human issues, and the
commercial success of work in the shipping industry and all concerned must
recognize that they are the human factor (MCA,2010). Although most of the vessels
operating on domestic voyages fall outside the sphere of IMO's activities, the
Organization highlights extreme importance on the domestic vessel safety and
requests member states to implement the best safety culture to standardize with
applicable. According to MSC103/8," model regulations (a) provide framework
provisions on domestic ferry safety for incorporation into national law; (b) do not
promulgate provisions on facilitation, security, and pollution; (c) are drafted in a way
to enable easy translation and incorporation into national law; and (d) may serve as a
basis for intergovernmental agreements, whether multilateral, bilateral or regional".
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Table 3- 1: Safety Problems for Domestic Vessels in Myanmar.

Vessel Type

Problem

Root Cause

Remark
(reactive control
)

Fishing

Personal Injury,
Capsizing,

Coastal

Grounding,
Flooding,
Overloaded ,
Inadequate
Stability
Collision,
Grounding
Capsizing,
Collision,
Communication
error,Stability

Inland
Ferry /
Passenger

Poor education,low
Safety
living& working
Awareness
condition, time pressure training (pre
monsoon)
Careless, Poor
Safety
maintenance, Owner
Awareness
interest
training (pre
monsoon)
Poor communication ,
lack of knowledge
Overcrowded,Economic Introduction of
pressure
Chindwin
Lack of monitoring
standard
Domestic ferry
safety
management
system

Source: Author.

Most vessels in Myanmar are operating along the coastline and inland waterway,
including fishing vessels and ferries. Therefore, the majority of the accident are
Collision, Flooding, Capsizing, and Fire happened in cargo, fishing, and ferry ships/
boats. Moreover, most casualties and loss of life in the Domestic fleet are fishing and
ferry sector due to human-related errors. Additionally, the lack of stakeholders'
involvement in maritime safety awareness training programs and knowledge sharing
events is the primary root cause of accidents in domestic shipping. However, there is
no standards procedure for the safety management system to minimize humanrelated casualties for all types of vessels in the Domestic fleet; consequently, the
number of accidents does not significantly decline.
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3.2

Description of the Domestic Shipping Sector in Myanmar

As of 2020, 3,800 vessels registered with the Department of Marine Administration
(DMA) for the Domestic fleet and transport approximately 93,400 passengers and
68,600 tons of freight; although the ownership structure has changed dramatically
over the years, the fleet has grown steadily. Total Gross tonnage 723300 operates
along the coastline, river, and islands of Myeik, Thanintharyi, and Rakhine
archipelagoes (DMA,2020). In addition, smaller vessels, below 20 horsepower, and
small barges registered at the local level are small and low-cost and typically made of
wood.
Table 3- 2: Lists of Domestic vessels registered in DMA – 2020.

Cargo Passenger Fishing Ferry

Tug

Cruise Barge

Coastal

404

25

347

-

-

-

-

776

Inland

1064

-

-

542

511

39

872

3028

Total

1963

25

347

542

511

39

872

3804

Source: DMA Internal documents.

3.3

Regulations for Domestic Ships

Myanmar Registration of Ships Act and Inland Vessels law set out the requirements
for registering under Myanmar flag also shipbuilding and survey of inland vessels.
DMA completes draft of Inland vessels registration law.

Myanmar Merchant Shipping Act includes a chapter exclusively for flagged ships' and
some of the articles are life-saving appliances, load lines, and unseaworthy ships.
Similarly, a chapter of Inland Vessels Law details the safety measures of vessels,
passengers, and shipped cargoes.
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National Requirements of Construction, Equipment, and Maintenance standards for
Non-convention cargo ships of more than 12 m in length are provided by directive
13/2015.

DMA provides training and certification programs for Domestic vessels as below:

1.

MOTC Notification 91/2019 Minimum Requirements for Myanmar Coastal

Master and Chief Mate Certificate of Competency.

2.

MOTC Notification 228/2018 Minimum Requirements for Myanmar Coastal

Engine Driver Certificate of Competency.

3.

MOTC Notification 229/2018 Minimum Requirements for Myanmar Coastal

Engineer Certificate of Competency.

4.

MOTC Notification 230/2018 Minimum Requirements for Myanmar Inland

Engine Driver Certificate of Competency.

5.

MOTC Notification 231/2018 Minimum Requirements for Myanmar Inland

Engineer Certificate of Competency.
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3.4

Accidents in Domestic Vessel Between 2010 to 2020

Figure 3- 1: Trend of Myanmar Domestic vessel accidents between 2010 to 2020.
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Source: Author as adopted from DMA records.

The Domestic vessels are classified by Cargo, Fishing, Ferry, Passenger, Cruise, Tug
and Barge, and other types based on design structure and nature of performing duty.
The Cargo ships are about 1,0500 to 100 gross tonnage trading near Myanmar
coastal and navigable river passage. Cargo ships : Trend highest number about 96
accidents while remaining stable during ten years cycle. Fishing vessels can be
categorized by carrier, trawlers, and non-trawler which were the second number of
the accident in Myanmar about 64 times in ten years cycle. However, the accident
rate of fishing vessels was unstable due to a sharp decline from 2011 to 2015 and
then significantly rose after 2015. Ferries, vital role of the transport sector in a rural
area, third major accident in Myanmar about 32 cases between 2010 to the 2020
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calendar year and accident trend peak up during 2019. Furthermore, Tug and Barge
are the backbone of inland waterway transport and the largest fleet in Myanmar,
nearly the same as the rate of Ferry accidents, about 31 cases during a decade.
Figure 3- 2: Type of domestic vessel accidents in Myanmar between 2010 to 2020.

DOMESTIC VESSEL ACCIDENTS IN
MYANMAR (2010 ~ 2020 )
Man overboard,
Other , 10, 4%
12, 5%
Grounding, 18,
8%

Collision, 75, 32%

Fire & Explosion,
35, 15%

Capsizing, 39,
16%

Flooding, 47, 20%

Source: Author as adopted from DMA records.

According to the Classification of Domestic vessel accidents in Myanmar, Collision is
the highest and thirty-two percentage of total cases in Domestic fleet. Flooding is the
second-highest number of accidents in Myanmar domestic fleet, about twenty
percent. Capsizing and Fire are the second and third significant cases, about sixteen
and fifteen percent of all total. Finally, grounding, man-overboard, and other
unspecified accidents are lease number of instances in Domestic vessels below ten
percent.
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3.5

Identification of Root Causes for Domestic Vessel Accident

Figure 3- 3: Accidents classification for the domestic fleet in Myanmar.

Classification of Acccidents
Other , 10, 4%
Ship
Structur
e
Failure,
21, 9%
Human Related Error
Weather

Machinery Failure,
30, 13%
Weather, 38, 16%

Machinery Failure
Human Related
Error, 137, 58%

Ship Structure Failure
Other

Source: Author as analysed from DMA records.

According to accident records, about 236 cases were reported to authorities within
eleven years, and 137 cases were based on human-related errors in the coastal and
inland waterways. By comparison, the fatalities rate in domestic shipping is
significantly higher than in international voyages. However, there is an incredible
finding that the major root causes of all accidents in domestic and international
voyages are nearly the same percent, with human-related error over 50 percent.
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Figure 3- 4: Comparing between Coastal and Inland Water Way for accident cases
from 2000 to 2020.
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Source: Author as analysed from DMA records.

The above graph showed that total accidents cases for eleven years in inland and
coastal areas were nearly the same. Therefore, trading areas are less influence by
the implementation of a safety management system within Myanmar water. Within
four years, from 2014 to 2018, insignificant trent of domestic vessel accident between
inland and coastal vessel, while found the highest different rate between two area for
the year of 2010 and 2019.
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Figure 3- 5: Accidents rate in different types of vessels in Myanmar Domestic fleet
between 2010 to 2020.
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Source: Author as analysed from DMA records.

The highest number of accidents happened in cargo, fishing, ferry, and tug between
2010 to 2020. After comparing the total vessel and total accident rates, fishing,
passenger, ferry, and cargo vessel are the highest in order. However, some accident
cases happened in unregistered vessels and small boats that DMA did not control.
The fishing sector is the highest rate for unregistered ships in Myanmar.
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3.5.1

Outcomes of the accidents

Figure 3- 6: Rate of casualties for a different type of vessels in Myanmar Domestic
fleet 2010- 2020.

Casualities in defferent type of vessel (2010 ~ 2020)
Total 438
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

123
81

79

77
33
19

Ferry

Ferry
(boat)

Fishing

Passenger

Cargo
(coastal)

Other

13

9

Cargo Below H.P
(Inland)
20

6
Tug &
Barge

Series 1

Source: Author as adopted from DMA records.

In Myanmar, significantly high casualties rates in the ferry sector and small boat,
fishing, and passenger vessels are the second-highest fatalities rates in Domestic
shipping. Very few fatalities rate in other sectors from 2010 to 2020, such as cargo,
tug, barge, and other types of vessels.

3.5.2

Official Accident Investigation Reports

There is only one investigation report was uploaded to IMO, Global Integrated
Shipping Information System (GISIS), and other accident investigation reports for the
domestic fleet are written in Myanmar language and kept in the Legal department and
Director General office of DMA. There is no specific board for maritime investigation,
and DMA handles it. Follow-up of these accidents in terms of new regulations by
Vessel Standardization for the upper Myanmar area is in progress, namely Chindwin
standards.
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3.6

Legal Discussion How Safety Management is Implemented in Other
Countries

The United States Coast Guard has released a draft advance notice of proposed
rulemaking on safety management systems for domestic passenger vessels,
including small passenger vessels. (Subchapter K vessels). The Coast Guard is
gathering public input on the scope, content, cost, and benefits of such a requirement
by doing so. According to Source: 336/ 2006 to cover Community ships operating
either internationally or domestically, "extends the application of the ISM Code,
regardless of the flag and compliance with regulation requires owners of domestically
trading vessels to implement a Domestic Safety Management system (DSM) which
based on the ISM Code Parts A & B". India, DG shipping provided the standards and
guidelines for Coastal and inland vessels regarding with audit and verification for
safety and environmental protection. Additionally, Asia and Pacific region countries
initiate domestic ferry safety with the support of The Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).
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Chapter Four

4.1

Human Factors Analysis Classification System (HFACS) and Analyzing

of Investigation Reports
This dissertation aims to examine accidents that happened between 2010 to 2020 for
general analysis and some selected typical accidents that have occurred in Myanmar
using the HFACS – MSS framework and taxonomy, as well as to implement an
effective safety management system for the domestic fleet. Thus, the purpose of this
dissertation is to examine with the HFACS – MSS framework for some selected typical
incidents that occurred in Myanmar in the past and to minimize accidents and
causalities in Myanmar Domestic shipping. Furthermore, lectures by both visiting
experts and WMU professors certainly contribute to this work.
As the technology has advanced over the years, machinery cause to the accident
has been reduced over time. However, there is more and more accident caused by
human factor. Additionally, the figure 3- 3 in chapter 3.5 shows that human error
contributes to 58% of Domestic vessel accidents, including the majority of navigation
accidents and Fire and explosions. Therefore, the study needs to analyze with
HFACS taxonomy to understand and prevent human error, which will be the key to
improving safety.

The concept itself has been discussed since the 1900s, while the proper research of
it had not begun until the 1970s before the two major accidents that happened by
human error, the ground collision of two air crafts in Tenerife (1977) and the Three
Mile Island accident in 1979 (Chen et al., 2013). Three Mile Island accident was one
of the most significant accidents in the United States and commercial nuclear power
plant history. It was a nuclear accident and released radioactive gases into the
environment and stoked the public fears about nuclear power. Investigation into this
accident has found several minor mechanical failures, which were made worse by
human errors. Therefore, after this accident, many academic conferences have been
gathered to discuss the problem of human error precisely two schools of thought. The
cognitive psychological school is best represented by Professor James Reason, a
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psychologist who studied how people make mistakes in daily life together is a joint
Cognitive system that emerged regarding the human and machine interface (Kim,
2021).
The Human Factor Classification and Analysis System (HFACS) was utilized to
review the casualty investigation reports. HFACS is based on James Reason's
"Swiss Cheese" model, which Douglas Wiegmann and Scott Shappell created for
aviation accidents in the U.S. Navy. However, James Reason's approach was never
intended to be used as a casualty inquiry framework. Several improvements to the
original framework have been made in subsequent years, allowing it to be used in a
variety of other scenarios, as well as those unrelated to transportation. HFACS has
been observed in aviation, health care, military forces, railroads, and even the mining
industry.
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Table 4- 1: Overview of the HFACS-MSS data structure

Source: IMO document, FSI 19/ INF.15.

Many of researcher applied with various accident causation hypothesis to achieve
depth of contribution factors. The above model,the improved HFACS for machinery
space is developed by Schroder-Hinrichs et al (2011), with an addition fifth level
called outside factors. According to the above hierarchy, factors go up from unsafe
acts to organizational influences. Each level is hooked on to the former by taking
place with activities to the latent form. According to IMO document, FSI19/ INF.15,
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"HFACS is seeking for causal components involved in fatality developments on five
different organizational levels: 1. Unsafe acts; 2. Preconditions for unsafe acts; 3.
Unsafe Supervision; 4. Organizational influences; and 5. Statutory.
Even though the fourth level may be considered a subset of Organizational impacts".

4.1.1

Unsafe Acts

Figure 4- 1: Classification of Unsafe acts.

Source: IMO document, FSI 19/ INF.15.

Unsafe acts are active failures, which are high-risk actions done by system operators
on the front line that directly and immediately impact the system's safety.
Alternatively, latent states can exist in a system for a long time without causing harm
(Guevara Hero, 2020)
Unsafe acts may clarify into two parts: errors and violation. Error is an untended
failure and forget to do something or performing an action or late response of any
action, whether alone or as part of a planned sequence of actions either singly or as
part of a planned sequence of action (Whittingham, 2004). The subcategories of
human errors are skill-based, decision and perceptual may lead to accidents and
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incidents. The Knowledge and skill description of human performance provides three
main human error categories: the failure of attention (slip), memory failure (lapse),
and technique, where errors are unintentional action and a mistake is an intended
action deliberately doing the wrong thing. However, there is no explicit decision to act
against it (Chen et al., 2013). Mistakes can be further divided into rule-based and
skill-based. Not all violations are adverse because sometimes violation could be no
choice and have to violate to be safe, and for intentional violation, they do not care
about the consequences(Kim, 2021). Violations are deviations from safe operating
practices, procedures, standards, or rules and are divided into routine and;
exceptional (situational or optimizing) violations.
4.1.2

Precondition for Unsafe Acts

Figure 4- 2: Classification of preconditions for unsafe acts.

Source: IMO document, FSI 19/ INF.15.

Active or latent preconditions for unsafe acts are essential factors in an accident. For
example, environmental factors, operators, and employees influence individuals'
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behaviours, resulting in an unsafe condition or operator error, resulting in an unsafe
condition or operator error (Onsongo. E.K, 2017). The above figure exhibiting
Individual elements and environmental factors embrace both physical condition and
human-environment interactions (cognitive) that include all kinds of conditions.
Cognitive factors that contribute to an error in cognitive or individual perceptions and
performance are influenced by environmental factors, which might lead to human
error or an undesirable condition and Improper body functioning, comprising the
physical and chemical processes of cells, tissues, organs, and systems. Their
complex interactions can cause an individual to make an error or engage in unsafe
behaviour.
4.1.3

Unsafe Supervision

Figure 4- 3: Illustration of unsafe supervision.

Source: IMO document, FSI 19/ INF.15.
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Inadequate Supervision, planned improper operations, supervisory violations, and
failure to rectify recognized problems are the four different factors of unsafe
Supervision. The factors are directly affected by practices, conditions, or actions from
management level decisions, procedures, or policies resulting in human error or a
dangerous environment at the managerial level to technical or support level
(Onsongo. E.K,2017).
4.1.4

Organizational Influences

Figure 4- 4: Categorization of organizational influences.

Source: IMO document, FSI 19/ INF.15.
Four groups are listed. According to the above figure, four categories are resource
management, organizational climate, organizational process, and statutory. Factors
in the above categories that contribute to an accident if high-level management's
statements, actions errors, or policies directly or indirectly impact managerial
procedures, settings, or crew member activity, resulting in malfunction, human error,
or an unsafe situation.
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4.2

Analyzing the data

Total 348 accidents have been documented in the internal file of DMA and general
data analysis from 2010 to 2020. However, the study with HFACS Taxonomy for
twenty accident reports is shown below and Appendix I.
Table 4- 2: Lists of uncoded accidents.

Date

Name/ Type

Type of

Location

of Vessel

Accident

Summary

Severity
1

28/04/20
13
Yangon
River

2

26/04/20
15
Yangon
River

M.V
"MALACCA
HIGHWAY"
(Container) &
M.T “MYAN
AUNG”
(Coastal
Tanker)

Collision

MV Panja
Bhum
(Container) ,
Zwe Myint
Myat Tun 3
(Tug)

Collision

Total loss
(Tanker)

Barge
sinking

31

The pilot from Container tried to
contact Tanker sailed with the tide,
but no replied. The captain raised
the whistle tried to announce the
Tanker vessel at a distance of
about 0.3 N-miles. About 14: 45
hours, the pilot ordered to master
of the Tanker vessel to change
course via VHF radio. Tanker
vessel responded that he had
been ordered to alter starboard
and refused to alter again to port.
The pilot ordered to stop the
engine and full astern; however,
two vessels collided.
Panja Phum collided with an
inland tug, Zwe Myint Myat Tun 3,
due to bad weather. There was no
proper lookout duty on both
vessels and no VHF radio
provided on the Inland tug. Master
and pilot from container ship
ignore the safe speed, and inland
tug master violated the inland
vessel rule ( sail to the right side
as far as possible ).

3

4

31/10/20
15
Long
Grate
Swirl,
Kalaywa,
Sagaing
Division
15/10/20
16
Monywa,
Sagaing
Division

5

19/12/20
16
Toe River
(Kyie
Htaw )

6

7

Yazar Tun
Ferry

Capsizing
Total loss
14 dead
and
25
missing

The vessel controlled by an
uncertified driver deviated from the
regular lane and proceeded to
swirl at 05:30 hr.

Aung Soe
Moe Kyaw 2
Ferry

Capsizing
Total loss
73 dead
and
41
missing

At (04: 45) hr., near Michaungtwin
village, the western bank of
Chindwin River, the vessel
capsized due to overturning the
steering because the driver tried to
return to regular waterway from
the wrong direction which directed
to the river bank.
Inland ferry, Pathein Thu 15
collided with a wooden boat, Chan
Myae Tun 2, at the Wae Gyi curve,
Toe River. The ferry sailed against
the tide and proceeding from
starboard lane with reduce speed.
However, the wooden boat
suddenly turned and crossing over
the ferry; consequently, the
wooden boat entered into the twinhull of the ferry then sunk.
At 04:20, the master from the
Cargo ship called the Container
ship twice via the VHF channel.
There was no reply from the
Container ship controlled by the
Myanmar pilot and Thailand
captain, and Htet Aung Lin been
handled with the coastal master
who holds the pilot exemption
permit.
All
navigation
and
manoeuvring equipment was
satisfactory and at about 05:00
hour collided the two vessels
during the port to port passing
A small ferry departed from
Pathein jetty with 59 persons
onboard, which was twice the
allowable
limit
and
some
passengers seated on the roof.
There was no navigational or
signal light
and life-saving
appliance onboard. A few minutes

Pathein Thu
15 , Chan
Myae Tun 2
Ferry &
Wooden cargo
boat

Collision
Small
boat
sinking

01/03/20
17
Yangon
River

MV Anan
Bhum
(Container)
and MV Htet
Aung Lin
1(Coastal
cargo)

Collision

07/04/20
17

Nadi Shwe Sin
(Tug), Ngwe
Kyal Pwint
(Under 20 H.P
Ferry)

Collision

Ngawon
River,
Pathein

Hull
damage
on both
vessels

31 loss of
life

32

after departure, a small ferry boat
collided with a tug and barge when
passing through the curve of
Ngawon River.
8

01/08/20
17
Gawine
jetty,
Mandala
y

RV Poukan
River Cruise

Fire
diminishe
d
one
cabin

9

29/08/20
17
Yangon
River

MV
Bangpakaew
(Container) ,
MFV Phyo
Pwint Maung /
Lin Yaung Thit
4 (Fishing)

Collision
sunk the
fishing
vessel (
Lin Yaung
Thit 4 )

10

25/02/20
18
Indawgyi
Lake,
Kachin
State

Under 20
Horse Power
Boat
Ferry

Capsizing
Nine loss
of life

33

During under repairing process,
the cruise dock at Gawain jetty,
Mandalay power supply from
shoreside. On the evening of 1st
August 2018, about 09:30 hours,
the fire broke out from repaired
room due to surge voltage and
shortcircuited. There was no fire
petrol arrangement and switch off
the power of sprinkler and fire
main system due to voltage
variation (220 ~ 440 v). Fire has
been
killed
by
portable
extinguisher after the 60 minutes.
container vessel, Bangpakaew
departed from Yangon against the
tide and fishing vessels, Phyo
Pwint Maung towed with Lin
Yaung Thit due to engine damage.
Both fishing vessels proceed to
Yangon with the. About 19:07, the
Pilot from the Container ship
informed
that
“Port-to-Port
crossing”
via
VHF
radio.
Meanwhile, the Fishing vessel did
not reply due to VHF malfunction.
After eight minutes, Fishing
vessels altered the course to port
immediately due to steering
malfunction consequently collided
with the starboard bow of the
container ship.
The unregistered small ferry
capsized near lwaemon village in
Indawgyi
Lake
during
bad
weather. The small boat was
designed for fishing and operated
by fishermen without a driver
license and carried passengers for
island pagoda during festival
season. According to the design
feature, the boat can carry six
persons only. However, 18
passengers were carried before

11

26/03/20
18
Daw
Nyein
village,
Pyarpone
,
Ayarwad
dy
Division

Aung Chan
Thar 3
Fishing

Fire
Total loss

12

13/06/20
18
Kawyar
village,
Homemal
in

Shwe Sin Oo

Capsizing
One
missing

24/03/20
19
Maw Tin
Soon (Lat.
16' 03.5'
(N)
&
Long 094'
11.8"

(CBR 0740)
Cargo Barge

13

Under 20
horse power
boat

Flooding
Total loss
One
missing
and one
severe
injury

34

the accident happened and
remaining the freeboard six inches
consequently, ingress water and
sinking after the strong wind.
During under repairing process,
the vessel dock at Daw Nyein
village. The shipowner and crew
brought the old engine to the shore
and left the vessel without a crew
or any watchkeeper. Before
leaving the ship, one of the crew
charged the mobile phone with a
power bank and lit a candle on the
shrine in the engine room. After
the fire occurred, all crew fought
with a portable fire pump.
However, the fire was an
uncontrollable condition and led to
exploding fuel oil storage tank.
Consequently, it burned out some
houses from shore and the whole
vessel. Major root causes were:
usage of naked light in the engine
room, fuel oil service tanks were
made with plastic, there was not
ready to fire extinguisher and sand
box.
Shwe Sin Oo, under 20H.P cargo
boat, departed from the jetty with
cargoes and 25 passengers.
Vessel out of control due to
jammed with floating dunnage
between propeller and rudder after
15 minutes departure. After that,
the vessel collided with another
ship and sunk.
The Inland tug towed the cargo
barge, which carried ship breaking
parts and fuel oil from the wreck
removing project. Barge bottom
part bumped with seabed twice
per day due to tidal condition and
barge operated over three months,
Barge has been flooded from
bottom hull where temporary
repaired and inclined to the port
side, and water ingress from
opened- manholes then difficult to
handle. After that, the cargo barge

bumps with rock and sinking. Tug
and barge were only permitted for
an inland waterway, and accidents
happened in the coastal area

14

15

16

25/07/20
19
26
Nautical
miles
from
Pathein
lighthous
e

MV.
HtarwaraAh
Arman
Cargo
(Coastal)

Capsizing

17/10/20
20
Tamalo
village,
Nyaungto
ne,
Hlaing
river

Regency
1(Tug) with OB
404 &
Yokohama
4(Tug) with
CBR 351, CBR
510

Collision

19/10/20
20
Layan
island,
Myeik,
Taninthar
yi Division

Aung Mingalar
5 (ON 4702)
Fishing

Capsizing
Total loss
Two
missing
and two
injuries

Total loss
Five dead
and two
missing

Hull
damage
and
oil
pollution
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About 14:13, sea water ingresses
to the main deck passed over 7
feet of bulwark due to heavy
waves with a strong wind from the
port bow. Consequently, two-third
of the cement pack from the
forecastle moved to the port side
alleyway, then all cargo collapsed
to the port side then capsized.
Regency 1 vessel towed with full
speed and communicated to
Yokohama 4 via VHF radio before
passing the tringle; however, loss
of connection after replied from
Yokohama vessel, which was
manned with an uncertified master
and engine driver. Both vessels
passed
the
tringle
without
continuous communication via
radio and collided with an oil barge
and two cargo barges.
The vessel returned from the
fishing zone, and all fishing nets
were stored on the starboard side
for sheltering due to storm
warnings.
About (07:30), the
vessel capsized to starboard were
kept in the fishing net due to strong
wind, then sunk two nautical away
from the island.
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24/10/20
20
Myungm
ya,
Ayarwad
dy
Division
11/11/20
20

Win Thiri Aung
( Ya Nya Na /
Ayar - 1376 )
Dredging and
sand carry
boat

Five
miles
away
from
Monywa,
Sagaing
Division

Cargo
(Shallow
water)

19

27/02/20
21
Myebon,
Rakhine
State

MV Kumudra
1
Cargo (coastal
)

Grounded
and
Capsizing
Total loss

20

28/04/20
21
Lat 17’ 57
(N), Long
94’ 00(E)

Toe Myat
Annawar
Fishing

Fire
Total loss

18

Win Win Htet
(15284)

Flooding
Total loss
and one
loss of life

The vessel carried sand with the
overloaded condition and docked
at the river bank for waiting for the
low tide. However, during low tide,
it flooded from the stern part and
then sunk.

Fire

The initial source of the Fire was
an overheated socket of battery
charging unit in the engine room,
and then the Fire spread out to the
fuel oil level gauge, which was
provided with plastic. There was
no watchkeeper in the engine
room and consequently did not
fight in time, leading to vessel fire.

Two
injuries

36

Kumudra
1
departed
from
Kantaung Gyi jetty, Myebon and
loaded with 600 tones of
construction rock. About 12:00
hour, Commenced heavy waves
and strong wind from starboard
beam together with high tide due to
full moon day. The vessel
proceeds voyage with difficult
steering control and poor visibility.
At about 13:30 hour, the vessel
collided with black rock and ran
aground, consequently flooded
due to tank damage. Ship crew
pumping out with three water
pumps and informed to ship owner
and other vessels. On the 18:00
hour, the vessel cleared from black
rock and capsized to the starboard
side. Master and crew were safely
rescued by Yadanarwin, a coastal
vessel.
Fishing vessel Caught fire from
engine room due to electric shock.
There was no certified engine
driver onboard and operated with
an assistance driver before the
accident happened. Electric shock
immersed from loosening socket,
plug and poor wiring system then
the fire spread out to fuel and finally

the whole vessel has been
destroyed although all crew has
been safe.

Source: Author

4.3

Severity and the contributing factors from twenty investigation reports

Table 4- 3: Severity and Contributing factors.
Factors

Severity

Total

Very high
(Total loss
and high
causality)
5 cases

High
(Total loss
and less
causality)
4 cases

Moderate
(Total loss
or Dead )
8 cases

Less
serious
(Damage
part)
3 cases

Unsafe Acts

19

11

32

15

77

Precondition
for unsafe acts

22

15

40

17

94

Unsafe
supervision
Organizational
Influences
Total

32

18

35

14

99

26

11

29

12

78

99

55

136

58

348

20
cases

Source: Author
The analysis has been taken from the internal document of DMA and retrieved from
twenty accident investigation reports for the Domestic shipping sector. Evaluation or
highlight any deviations in the study, the coding was examined by a flag state
surveyor and expert in domestic vessel accident investigation. By modifying the
IMO's guidelines for casualty report analysis, severity was summarized in several
seriousness categories as indicated in the above table and the cause elements
classified after evaluating the collection data of domestic vessel accidents around
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Myanmar. The severity of accidents is classified into four categories: very high to less
severe cases depending on the rate of causality and properties loss.

4.4

Summary of HFACS analysis from twenty investigation reports

Table 4- 4: Summary of HFACS analysis.

Figures

Reported HFACS Causal Factors
Statutory
FS xxx

Statutory
FS 000 International standards
FS 100 Flag state implementation
Organizational Influences
OR xxx
Resource management
OR
Human resources
000
OR
Technological Resources
100
OR
Equipment/facility resources
200
OC xxx
Organizational climate
OC
Structure
000
OC
Policies
100
OC
Culture
200
OP xxx
Organizational Process
OP
Operations
000
OP
Procedures
100
OP
Oversight
200
Unsafe supervision/work place factors
SI xxx
Inadequate supervision
SI 000
Shipborne
and
shore
supervision
SP xxx
Planned inappropriate operations
SP 000 Shipborne operations
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No.
8
8
2
6
70
20
11

%
2.29 %
2.29 %
0.57 %
1.72 %
20.11 %
5.75 %
3.16 %

4

1.15 %

5

1.44 %

23
9

6.61 %
2.58 %

1

0.28 %

13

3.73 %

27
5

7.78 %
1.44 %

7

2.01 %

15

4.31 %

99
32
32

28.45 %
9.19 %
9.19%

22
22

6.32 %
6.32 %

SF xxx

Failed to correct known problems

12

3.45 %

SF 000

12

3.45 %

33
33
94
38
24
14
27
19
8
29
12
17
77
48
28
15

9.48 %
9.48 %
27.01 %
10.92 %
6.89 %
4.03 %
7.75 %
5.46 %
2.29 %
8.33 %
3.45 %
4.88 %
22.13 %
13.79%
8.04 %
4.31 %

5
29
17
12
348

1.44 %
8.33 %
4.88%
3.45 %
100%

Shipborne
related
shortcomings
SV xxx
Supervisory violations
SV 000 Shipborne violations
Preconditions for unsafe acts
PE xxx
Environmental factors
PE 100 Physical environment
PE 200 Technological environment
PC xxx
Crew Condition
PC 100 Cognitive factors
PC 200 Physiological state
PP xxx
Personnel factors
PP 100 Crew interaction
PP 200 Personnel readiness
Unsafe acts
AE xxx
Errors
AE 000 Skill-based errors
AE 100 Decision
and
judgement
errors
AE 200 Perceptual errors
AV xxx
Violations
AV 000 Routine violations
AV 100 Exceptional violations
Total

Source: Author as adopted from Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011.

There are three hundred, and forty-eight factors were identified for twenty accident
cases, and unsafe supervision had the highest ranking among all factors, about 28.45
percent. In addition, the subcategory " Supervisory violations " within the major
category " Unsafe supervision " had the most prominent values among all
components, accounting for 9.48 percent of all causal factors.
As a result, the statistics imply that the causes of marine casualties are still primarily
attributable to shipborne violations due to lack of supervision. In contrast,
Organizational contributing factors were not attributed to the specific case of
accidents.
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4.4.1

Comparison between Severity and contribution factors

Figure 4- 5: Comparison between Severity and contribution factors.

Unsafe Acts

45
Preconditions
for unsafe acts
40
35

Unsafe
40 supervision

Organisational influence

35
32

32
29

30

26

25
20
15

22
15

19

18

17
14

15
12

11

11

10
5
0

Less Serious

Moderate

High

Very High

Unsafe Acts

15

32

11

19

Preconditions for unsafe acts

17

40

15

22

Unsafe supervision

14

35

18

32

Organisational influence

12

29

11

26

Contribution Factors

Severity of Accidents

Source: Author
According to HFCS analysis results from twenty investigation reports, the above chart
illustrates how the severity of accidents is related to the contributing factors, i.e.,
unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe Supervision, and organizational
influence.
The bar chart mentioned in figure 4-5 provides 32 casual factors of unsafe Supervision
that are the leading cause of the very high severe accidents (resulting in total loss and
high causality). Twenty- six organizational influences take the second and 22 causal
factors of precondition for unsafe acts the third. The least contributing factor in the
most severe accidents is unsafe acts, which constitute only 19 factors.
In second-most severe accidents (resulting in total loss and less causality), 18 factors
of unsafe Supervision also take the leading role, followed by 15 factors of precondition
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for unsafe acts. The unsafe acts and the organizational influences are the least found,
which constitute 11 factors evenly.
In moderate-severe accidents (resulting in total loss and injury), 40 factors of
precondition for unsafe acts take the leading role, and 35 elements of unsafe
Supervision take the second leading role, followed by 32 aspects of unsafe acts and
29 the organization influences.
In the least severe accidents (resulting in only damaged parts), 17 factors of the
precondition for unsafe acts take the leading role, and 15 unsafe acts take the second.
Fourteen factors of unsafe supervision the third and 12 factors of organizational
influences the fourth. In summary, unsafe Supervision is the main related factor to the
most severe accidents, while the precondition for unsafe acts is mainly found in the
moderate and least severe accidents.

4.4.2

Highlight of Contribution Factors

Figure 4- 6: Highlight of Contribution Factors.

Contribution Factors
Statutory
2%

Organisational
influences
20%

Unsafe Acts
22%

Unsafe supervision
29%

Preconditions for
unsafe acts
27%

Source: Author
This pie chart shows the highlighted description of the contributing factors identified
in maritime accidents according to twenty investigation reports: (1) statutory; (2)
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unsafe acts; (3) organizational influences; (4) unsafe supervision; (5) preconditions
for unsafe acts.
Out of the contributing factors identified, unsafe supervision and preconditions for
unsafe acts take the leading role with 29 percent and 27 percent, respectively,
representing slightly over one-quarter of all categories. Those two categories, as
mentioned earlier, are immediately followed by unsafe acts with 22 percent,
representing approximately one-quarter of all categories. Finally, organizational
influences stand the fourth rank with 20 percent, while statutory acts are the least
contributing factor with 2 percent.

In conclusion, as per the investigation reports of domestic vessel accidents, unsafe
supervision and preconditions for unsafe acts are the main root causes of such
accidents.

4.4.2.1 Unsafe Acts
Figure 4- 7: Contribution of unsafe acts

Unsafe acts
Exceptional
violation, 12,
16%
Skill-based
errors, 28,
36%

Routine
violation
s, 17,
22%

Decision and
judgement errors,
15, 19%
Perceptual
errors, 5, 7%

Skill-based errors
Perceptual errors
Exceptional violation

Decision and judgement errors
Routine violations
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Source: Author
Unsafe acts are causal factors at the lowest organizational level. It relates to active
actions carried out by crew members where the outcome does not necessarily
match the original intention.
The pie chart stated above shows how many percentages of unsafe acts contribute
to twenty maritime accidents stated in the investigation reports. As per the
investigation reports on twenty maritime accidents, 77 identified unsafe factors (22
percent of the total causal factors) are the second least found in those twenty
accidents. Unsafe acts can result from errors and/ or violations.
The details of the said unsafe acts (22% of total causal factors) according to twenty
maritime accidents investigation reports, errors are the main root cause for causing
accidents (62% in total), which represents (1) skill-based errors (36%); (2) decision
and judgment errors (19%); and (3) perceptual errors (7%) respectively. Violations
are factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator represent a willful disregard
for rules and instructions and lead to an unsafe situation. Violations are also divided
into two subcategories: (1) routine violations and (2) exceptional violations. According
to the pie chart stated above, violations represent 38 percent of total causal factors of
unsafe acts: (1) routine violations (22%); and (2) exceptional violations (16%),
respectively.

To sum up, among the factors of unsafe acts, skill-based errors are the dominant
factors (with 36%), representing over one-quarter of all factors, followed by the second
dominant factor of routine violation with 22 percent. Decision and judgment errors
stand the third rank with 19 percent, exceptional violations take the fourth with 16
percent, and perceptual errors are the least found with 7 percent.
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4.4.2.2

Preconditions for unsafe acts

Figure 4- 8: Contribution of preconditions for unsafe acts.

PRECONDITIONS
Personal
readiness, 17,
18%

Physical
environment, 24,
26%

Crew interaction,
12, 13%

Technical
environment, 14,
15%

Physiological
state, 8, 8%
Cognitive factors,
19, 20%

Source: Author
Preconditions for unsafe acts were introduced in the HFACS framework to consider
the immediate precursors to unsafe acts. Factors on this level relate to environmental
(workspace) factors (e.g., faulty equipment), crew conditions (e.g., fatigue), or
personnel factors (e.g., inadequate training).
The above figure shows how many percentages of preconditions for unsafe acts
contribute to twenty maritime accidents stated in the investigation reports. According
to twenty maritime accidents investigation reports, 94 factors of preconditions for
unsafe acts (with 27% of the total causal factors identified) take up the second most
considerable portion of all aspects identified causing those twenty maritime accidents.
However, in terms of severity, these preconditions for unsafe acts are the main factors
contributing to moderate-severe accidents and less severe accidents.
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Preconditions for unsafe acts are divided into three sub- categories, which are namely
(1) environmental factors, (2) crew condition, (3) personnel factors.
Environmental factors are factors in a mishap if physical or technological factors affect
individuals' practices, conditions, and actions and result in human error or an unsafe
situation. Environment factors have two subcategories: (1) physical environment; and
(2) technological environment.

Crew conditions are factors in a mishap if the cognitive, psycho-behavioural, adverse
physical State or physical/mental limitations affect individuals' practices, conditions,
or actions and result in human error or an unsafe situation. Crew conditions have two
subcategories: (1) cognitive factors; and (2) physiological State.

Personnel factors are factors in a mishap if self-imposed stressors or crew resource
management affect individuals' practices, conditions, or actions and result in human
error or an unsafe situation. Personnel factors are divided into two subcategories: (1)
crew interaction; and (2) personnel readiness.

In consideration of the details of such preconditions for unsafe acts (27% of the total
causal factors identified in the figure 4-6 ), as stated in the pie chart above according
to 20 maritime accidents investigation reports. Environmental factors lead with 41
percent representing physical environment with 26 percent and technological
environment with 15 percent respectively. Personnel factors take the second rank with
31 percent, representing crew interaction with 13 percent and personnel readiness
with 18 percent. Finally, crew conditions are the least found with 28 percent, which
represents cognitive factors with 20 percent and physiological State with 8 percent,
respectively.

In conclusion, the physical environment is the most dominant factor (with 26%), while
cognitive factors are the second leading factor with 20 percent. Personal readiness
stands the third rank with 18%, and technical environment takes the fourth rank with
15 percent, followed by crew interaction with 13 percent. Finally, the lease one is the
physiological state of crew condition about 8 percent.
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4.4.2.3

Unsafe supervision

Figure 4- 9: Contribution of unsafe Supervision.

UNSAFE SUPERVISION
Inadequate
supervision, 32,
32%

Supervisory
violations, 33,
34%

Planned
inapproprite
operations, 22,
22%

Failed to correct
known problems,
12, 12%

Source: Author
Unsafe Supervision is a factor in a mishap if the methods, decisions, or policies of the
supervisory chain of command (officers at management level over operational and
support levels) directly affect individuals' practices, conditions, or actions and result
in human error or an unsafe situation.

The above figure states how many unsafe supervision percentages contribute
towards twenty maritime accidents stated in the investigation reports. According to
HFACS analysis from twenty investigation reports, 99 factors of unsafe Supervision
(with 29% of the total causal factors identified) take up the most significant portion of
all causal factors identified, causing the said twenty maritime accidents. In terms of
severity, unsafe supervision is the main root cause of moderate, severe accidents and
very high severe accidents.

Unsafe Supervision is divided into four categories, namely, (1) inadequate
Supervision, (2) planned inappropriate operations, (3) failure to correct known
problems, and (4) supervisory violations.

46

Inadequate Supervision is a factor in a mishap when Supervision proves inappropriate
or improper and fails to identify the hazard, recognize and control risk, provide
guidance, training, and/or oversight, and results in human error or an unsafe situation.
In addition, inadequate Supervision has a subcategory – shipborne and shore
supervision, which is a factor in a mishap when the interaction between officers at the
management level and managers directly bear the day-to-day running and operation
of the machinery space leading to an unsafe situation.

Planned inappropriate operations are factors in a mishap when Supervision fails to
assess the hazards associated with an operation adequately and allows for
unnecessary risk. It is also a factor when Supervision allows non-proficient or
inexperienced personnel to attempt tasks beyond their capability or when crew
complement is inappropriate for the task. The planned improper operation has a
subcategory – shipborne operations, which are factors in a mishap when the
interaction between officers at management and operational levels and support levels
directly bears the day-to-day running and operation of the machinery space to an
unsafe situation.

Failed to correct known problems is a factor in a mishap when officers at the
management level fail to correct deficiencies in documents, processes, or procedures
or fail to correct inappropriate or unsafe actions of individuals. This lack of supervisory
action creates an unsafe situation. In addition, failed to correct know problems has a
subcategory – shipborne shortcomings, which is a factor in a mishap when officers at
the management level do not comply with safety management practices, leading to
an unsafe situation.

Supervisory violations are factors in a mishap when officers at the management level
willfully disregard instructions, guidance, rules, or operating instructions whilst
managing organizational assets, and this lack of supervisory responsibility creates an
unsafe situation. Supervisory violations have a subcategory – shipborne violations,
which are factors in a mishap when violations are committed by operating and support
level, machinery space crew members are tolerated by officers at management level,
leading to an unsafe situation.
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Having conducted a thorough review of the details of such unsafe Supervision as
stated in the pie chart of this chapter 4.4.2.3, supervisory violations lead with 34
percent, followed by inadequate Supervision with 32 percent. Finally, the planned
inappropriate operation took the third with 22 percent and failed to correct known
problems is the causal factor which least found with 12 percent.

In summary, among factors of unsafe supervision, supervisory violations are the most
dominant factor (with 34%) while failed to correct known problems is the least
dominant factor (with 12%).
4.4.2.4

Organizational Influences

Figure 4- 10: Contribution of organizational influences.

ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES
Human resources
16%

Oversight
21%

Technological
resources
6%
Facility resources
7%

Prcedures
10%

Operations
7%

Structure
13%
Policies
1%

Culture
19%

Source: Author
Organizational influences are factors in a mishap if the communications, actions,
omissions, or policies of upper-level management directly or indirectly affect
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supervisory practices, conditions, or actions of the crew member(s) and result in
system failure, human error, or an unsafe situation.
The above figure shows how many percentages of organizational influences
contribute towards investigation reports. According to HFACS analysis, 70
organizational influences factors (with 20% of the total causal factors identified) take
up the second least portion of all factors identified, causing those twenty maritime
accidents. In terms of severity, the factors of organizational influences together with
statutory factors take the leading role in the moderate-severe maritime accidents and
the most severe maritime accidents.
In thorough consideration of the above figure, oversight to organizational process
contributes to human error of unsafe situation take the leading role with 21 percent.
Safety culture within the organization creates an unsafe condition which stands the
second rank with 19 percent, followed by human resource with 16 percent. Improper
structure and framework of the organization stand the fourth role with 13 percent,
while the improper procedure of the organizational process contributes 10 percent
only. Poor or lack of facility resources and sub-standard operation equally take the
fifth rank with 7 percent. Finally, policy influences on organizational safety are least
contribute to those twenty maritime accidents.
The most dominant factors are oversight under the organizational process and culture
under the organizational climate. In contrast, policies under the organizational climate
are the least dominant factors.
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4.4.2.5 Statutory

Figure 4-11: Contribution of statutory.

STATUTORY
Internatinoal
standards
25%

Flag state
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Source: Author
Statutory are factors in a mishap if the regulator's regime is either sub-standard or
lacks the necessary depth, leading to an unsafe situation.
Under statutory, there are two factors, namely (1) international standards; and (2) flag
state implementation. International standards are factors in a mishap when setting
international standards or contributing to human error or an unsafe situation. Flag
state implementation is a factor in an accident when the enforcement of regulations
at the national level is sub-standard, contributing to an unsafe condition.
The above figure shows how many percentages of related statutory factors contribute
to domestic vessel accidents. According to analysis, flag stage implementation is the
leading factor with 75 percent, while international standards rank with 25 percent.
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Chapter Five

5.1

Interview with stakeholders

The analysis with the HFACS method helped highlight the key contributing factors
and consider overall domestic vessel safety together with interview results from
individual stakeholders. The interview result may support the discussion and
recommendation section aligning with general and HFACS analysis to get clear
pictures.
5.2

Discussion for the contributing factors of HFACS analysis and interview
questions

Several studies have found that specific organizational factors are not always
investigated under the IMO models. Furthermore, for various reasons, accident
investigation reports are typically missing in the organizational context (SchroderHinrichs, 2010). The outcomes from the previous chapter were examined relate to
twenty accidents investigated reports. However, some reports are impossible to get a
clear picture of contributing factors to proceed discussion section. Therefore, an
additional interview with specific stakeholders for reviewing the information and
analyzing the gap between the investigation reports and on-ground conditions
achieves an essential data source for understanding how domestic vessel accidents
are handled in Myanmar.
5.3

Unsafe Acts

Unsafe acts involving errors and violations are more common in fishing vessels,
coastal vessels, and cargo barges than in other types of vessels. Errors, mainly
skilled-based errors and decision/judgment errors, are the most common unsafe acts
that caused accidents throughout the research. Statistically, skill-based errors are
significantly higher than other factors. Masters and crew with poor seamanship and
techniques: where there were no draft measurement and adjustment of the mooring
line during dock; all fishing nets stored at one side only; sailing with full speed with
against the current and not given way for other vessels with the current; sail the wrong
way from the regular lane and proceed to swirl; the poor practice of hot work and
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usage of naked flame in machinery space; not having anyone assigned for a proper
lookout and watch-keeping on the vessels, and the inadequacy of the system to
provide training and drills especially for cases of emergency. Such poor seamanship
and techniques are consequently causing a delay in commencing the orders, thus
resulting in too late to reduce speed, preparing the life-saving appliance before
sinking; delay in radiocommunication. Not only are delays in commencing orders
concerned, but wrong decision-making during operation accounts for a considerable
percentage of unsafe acts. Thus, it clearly shows under-qualification of crews and
masters mainly causes the errors of unsafe acts. Regardless of their underqualification, the crew and operators are generally overconfident and have negative
habits that trigger the likelihood of causing accidents. Perceptual errors were also
shared in unsafe acts errors in cases where the operators presumed that the accident
was unlikely during the voyage. Skippers are found to be grounding and, in a collision,
due to the choice of the wrong waterway. Intentional routine violations are found to
be the repeating causes of frequent collisions increasing the risk of grounding.
Violation of standing orders and regulations, the voyage with overcrowded
passengers, and overloaded vessels are identified as the recurring actions that lead
to capsizing and sinking of the vessels. As a result, the possibility of
miscommunication and misunderstanding during operations increases when
uncertified masters make incorrect decisions and the crew is unable to follow complex
orders. Habitual actions, in particular, cargo barges carrying petroleum products,
including diesel and gasoline, enhances the potential cause of accidents during the
trade. Most fishing and coastal vessels had fuel oil in drums and stored onboard,
resulting in vessel fire. Most capsizing is caused by improper loading and
overcrowding, unavoidable touching with underwater objects, and the wrong decision
of unqualified masters.
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5.4

Preconditions

5.4.1

General and crew conditions

Many unsafe acts have been attributed to other forms of preconditions, including but
not limited to the use of old age vessels and failure of adequate maintenance of the
vessels. Due to a lack of certified masters, crews, and engineer officers, multiple
errors of the exact nature are recurring on a routine basis until the day of the
occurrence of the accident. Masters are not familiar with current vessels since the
positions are not permanent and have poor crew understanding of safety awareness.
No specific safety guidelines and no certification system for crew master and engine
driver only have the certificate. Owing to low education level, the mindset of the crew,
and poor safety awareness, use mobile phones during working hours leads to a lack
of alertness and focus on work. The crew were not trained for proper fire fighting
procedures and safety emergency response; consequently, minor errors lead to high
accident severity. Owing to loop hole of the training program, safety awareness of
master and crew in domestic shipping has not dramatically improved within ten years.

5.4.2

In coastal shipping

Navigational types of equipment are out of date, and improper use of navigation aids
leads to collision and not backup arrangements such as the incomplete set of the
chart may not support GPS out of order. The outbreak of engine room fire results from
improper wiring arrangement and poor knowledge of fuel oil storage and handling
procedure. There is no lifeboat on coastal vessels and equivalent means of provision
with life rafts which are not actual servicing and only approved on documents due to
insufficient service providers. Most masters and managers fail to alert all crew during
heavy weather. The incorrect procedure of cargo lashing and securing arrangements
may lead to capsizing during heavy weather and collide with other vessels due to
miss-communication and Inadequate training for COLREG 72.
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5.4.3

Inland waterway

Most shippers operating in upper Myanmar are uncertified and navigate the vessel
with the aid of shore-side marking by their experience. There may be high draft
variation between raining when the swirl effect leads to capsizing and summertime
may lead to grounding. Therefore, design features for the summer season operate
along the Chindwin River are unfit for trade-worthy in raining season, vice versa. In
2006, time constraints of passengers demanded high-speed craft construction and
issued licenses to operate in upper Myanmar. After 2010, most passengers preferred
high-speed ferries and kicked out the larger vessels owned by Inland Water Transport
(IWT); as a result, small and high-speed vessels were more prone to endanger safety.
High-speed craft with outboard engine design combines with propeller and rudder
more prone to failure after jam with floating material. There is no permanent crew
onboard, and they move to gold mining projects according to seasonal business.
Typically, the end of the rainy season causing landslides may lead to collapsing trees
into rivers - tree floats and tree sunken causing the collision with the ship (unavoidable
accidents); it is a high risk for wooden vessels. For steel barge and vessel, separate
watertight compartments provide sufficient buoyancy even one compartment is
flooding. However, the old age of the barge and poor maintenance of the watertight
bulkhead is more prone to sink after a run ground or collide. Ayeyarwaddy west coast
frequent landslides- Myin Mu has only one lane with rocky reefs, resulting in a higher
risk of collision. Worst areas- between Myan Aung and KaNaung filled with rocky reefs
and tidal effects/ river current. Pyay-ShweTaung summer rocky reefs alongside AKout-Mountain, the wider passage led to more shallow water creating a higher risk of
touching with reefs. Danu Phyu and Yay Kin do not have tidal effects/ tidal free area
(1ft difference -high tide and low tide). Areas lower to DaNu Phyu do not have
grounding but only collision. Before the rainy season, grounding shows as the most
significant number and Fire has the smallest number. Another reason for high risk is
the water level only decreases at a high rate resulting in a short duration to prepare
and avoid the collision. Bamaw, KaThar, Mandalay, Min Bu, Aung Lan- most frequent
accident areas.
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5.4.4

Dockyards

Lack of standards for welding equipment, wiring system, breakers, safety expert in
dockyard field, inadequate safety measures and personal protective equipment,
unskilled labour, lack of risk assessment procedure before any repair or modification,
lack of compulsory life insurance for all dock workers.

5.5

Unsafe Supervision

The HFACS data and interview data identified several unsafe supervision factors. The
indicated that lack of adequate supervisory system and enforcement on crew
awareness are deliberately neglected to presume as a vital factor. Inadequate
Supervision of various forms, i.e., inadequate leadership or oversight in shipborne
and shore Supervision; lack of supervisory situational awareness has been identified
to be highly frequent. Failure to order the assigned duty; failure to report back to
monitoring team; improper watch-keeping system established; no explicit instruction;
concern more on the sale of tickets rather than checking the actual boarding
passenger list; lack of Supervision for tidal condition, cargo securing arrangement;
lack of instruction to alert heavy weather are all the result of inadequate supervisions
before and during the voyage. During the night, supervisory policies are less likely to
be followed, increasing the chances of accidents. Additionally, lack of effective
execution of feedback to fix the underlying problem regardless of reporting procedure
was identified as one of the factors contributing to the unsafe Supervision.
In terms of planned inappropriate operations, it is normal for local crew members to
have limited recent or overall experience and proficiency in seamanship because the
majority of crew members did not get systematic seamanship training and instead
learned it naturally from their seniors. The ship owners were operating the voyage
without systematic seamanship, appropriate monitoring, adequate Supervision, or
formal risk assessment, emphasizing the monetary profit from the voyage.
Additionally, a lack of verifying process for crew and ship owner certificates as well as
vessel certificates loosen the threshold of the quality of the domestic crew.
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The majority of incidents of failure to correct known problems arose when
management was aware that the vessel was unfit or required maintenance yet
permitted it to continue operating. The supervisory positions failed to correct
inappropriate and risky behaviour and safety hazards, update manuals, and initiate
corrective action mainly because of two reasons: firstly, they view such actions as
unnecessary extra work, and secondly, cutting costs. Supervisors and ship owner
representatives who remain onboard and the shipper or master fail to undertake
efforts to improve vessel safety standards, only realizing the repercussions after
incidents.
Repeated violations of engaging with the unqualified crew and failing to enforce rules
and regulations against such violations hinder the effective supervision system,
resulting in being unable to manage the subordinates effectively. The shore-based
management instance only applied to river cruises. There is no linked to insurance
policies and safety management certifications due to the significant challenges in
complying with the DSM system in inland waterways. However, some ship owners
voluntarily insured their barges trading in inland waterways and general cargo ships
trading in coastal voyages. The vessel monitoring team did not inspect the overloaded
vessel before departure.
Furthermore, there are contradictions between the DMA survey and the underwriting
survey for insurance. The main reason is the shortage of fire safety appliances and
shifts to other vessels after inspection of DMA surveyors. Furthermore, masters on
coastal vessels are only trained for navigation purposes, while cargo clerks are
officially listed as crew and manage the loading and discharging operation.

5.6

Organizational Influence

5.6.1

Organization

Policy: There were no effective outcomes from Myanmar Maritime University (MMU)
delegations who attended international seminars and workshops for the maritime
legislation process due to insufficient resources. Most lecturers and professors
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specialized in academic teaching only, and no standardized educational system for
all domestic crew to improve skill-based.
Resource Management: Collision avoidance training is not aligned with COLREG
72, and no clear collision avoidance rule has been published. Furthermore, lack of
training for emergency response and proper radio usage for all domestic masters and
crew. As a result, shipowners and managers run their vessels with cheap and
unqualified operators to save costs and provide unsuitable equipment. Additionally,
no training and drill prevent accidents, especially before the festival, long public
holidays, and vacation time.
Organizational Climate: Operational management plan and a safety certificate to be
submitted to DMA before applying the license to comply for all companies; however,
some ferries owners manage their vessels with individual interest after being issued
the license to operate. For example, the Vessel association was allowed to run for the
unregistered vessel. The general administrative department issues license for the
small boat without following the registration guidelines. As a result, small boats
operate in rural areas without a carried or insufficient life jacket. In addition, accidents
are not recorded systematically, thus leading to a lack of correct data. Significantly, a
lot of accidents happened in Homaling. At the same time, it was not recorded, it is
difficult to come up with exact data for the public improper navigational traffic
management system.
Process: Currently, only 25 vessels trading in near-coastal voyages carried a safety
management certificate. Two kinds of crew lists are submitted to the fishing
department, and DMA are not matching, and the monitoring team may not inspect all
vessels at every checkpoint. Issuing the dockyard license by general authorities
office, and no specific orders and guidelines for dockyards safety standards; as a
result, lack of monitoring for safety compliance and accountability for any accidents
that happen in docking. Furthermore, Myanmar shipyards, an enterprise under
MOTC, controls all dockyards and has insufficient technical experts for maritime
safety.
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5.6.2

Statutory

Lack of adequate safety standards and enforcement systems for all domestic fleets.
Inland steam vessel out of date is a loophole between regulatory framework and
enforcement. The major weak point of the private vessel monitoring rule developed
by the Sagaing divisional government was monetary penalties only and allowed port
clearance during weather warnings for coastal and fishing vessels.
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Chapter Six

6.1

Implementation framework

Figure 6- 1: Implementation Framework for Domestic Safety Management System.

Source: ISO 31000 and Dr Anish Hebbar's ppt; IMO-UN ESCAP Expert Group
Meeting on Improving Domestic Ferry Safety (2020).

According to IMO member state obligation and enhancing the maritime safety
standards, Myanmar shall have a regulatory framework as shown in the figure above,
which will disclose the problems and provide practical solutions.
6.1.1 Integration
MSC Circular 103/8, draft model regulation for domestic ferry safety, will be used to
develop the framework, which will include all articles elaborate on the construction,
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alteration, conversion, monitoring of management, and operational safety of domestic
shipping, in addition to onboard and shore staff education and training.
6.1.2 Design Principle
Design concepts of domestic safety management system design shall be aligned with
technical, economic, and legal requirements to bring safety and economic benefits.
6.1.3 Implementation
The implementation process align with health safety and environmental protection
policy shall retain direct responsibility of DMA for monitoring and auditing of operating
companies whose fly in Myanmar domestic water. According to the international
practice of DSM code, clearly define the duties and responsibilities of master and all
crew as well as line of communication to designated person from shore management.
Companies or shipowners are responsible for providing appropriate training to ensure
an effective implementation process of top to bottom down a level. Additionally, the
company or owner draw up simple procedures and guidelines for every operation and
respond to emergency conditions regarding safety and pollution matter.
6.1.4 Evaluation
DMA will conduct the appropriate audit and provide the Document of Compliance
certificate (DOC) for the company and the Safety management certificate (SMC) for
the vessel. The renewal audit develops the safety framework, evaluate regulatory
gaps and effectiveness, and review and revise as needed annually for every vessel
and every 2.5 years for a company.
6.1.5 Improvement
By promoting technological and economic progress, the safety framework can be
improved to meet regional and international standards.
6.1.6 Recommendation
To improve Myanmar tourism and maritime transportation, the Department of Marine
Administration (DMA)under the Ministry of Transport and Communications had to set
up and establish the safety of navigation, the proper safety regulations, safety
standards, and the rationalized inspection system for all domestic vessels. Inland,
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smooth water, and maritime zones are needed to be set up for safe navigation of
vessels to improve safe navigation and good tourism. Inland vessel trading zone can
be extended wider so that passenger ships and other inland vessels may have travel
areas until a smooth water zone. Furthermore, every alternate docking, all domestic
steel ships older than ten years shall be examined hull plate thickness and replaced
as necessary and standardized the dockyards.
An efficient insurance policy shall be developed to provide a second line of defence
for safety standards, allowing underwriter surveyors to examine their insured ships.
To achieve an effective legal framework, assigning the regulatory body (DMA) to
attend an international seminar and workshop regarding maritime safety. Engaging in
interaction, debate, and consultation with shipowners and drivers, DMA adopts
operative techniques to establish and strengthen safety culture. Safety standards may
achieve not only on one Organization. Best way to approach- authority should provide
detailed instruction to companies. Companies should provide detailed instructions to
the owner and crew. All stakeholders should be harmonized in approaching the
problems; onboard and shore-based management should be coordinated.
The shipowner shall establish a sea service matrix system for a specific type of
voyage that may support an experience-based promotion system. Life-Saving
Appliances should be consistent with each trading area rather than having fixed
equipment for all kinds of routes. Cargo storage and securing arrangements, as well
as dedicated places for hazardous items, should be provided. To prevent
overcrowded and overload for all passenger vessels, establish the monitoring
arrangement provided with CCTV camera for before departure inspection at all major
ports and random spot check scheme along the rivers. The adequate mean of access
for embarkation and disembarkation in every port to be provided Establishing the
reporting procedure for Key Performance Indicator (KPI) for the specific type of
vessels and inspection team. Safety videos and teaching facilities were made
available onboard, in ports, and at local administrative offices to reduce human error.
Before festival seasons, it was appointed with a dedicated management team to
conduct exercises and drills.
As a top priority, establish the Domestic Safety Management System (DSMS) in the
Sagaing and Rakhine regions as soon as possible due to individual responsibilities
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(Muster list), safety manuals, operational procedures, emergency drills, and exercises
with various scenarios are all extremely useful in improving safety standards. Drill and
exercise to be carried out for good practice to eliminate skill-based errors, apply to
standardize rules and procedures for rule-based errors elimination, and provide safety
lecture and video for knowledge-based errors of individual and organizational
mistakes. To be submitted project proposals related to domestic safety to the World
Bank and other financial supported organizations. Negotiate with all financial
authorities for import and income tax relief for shipowners in accordance with
domestic safety regulations. Domestic vessels shall be the co-operative or public
company to align with free and fair competition law according to the DMA system's
registration process and standard operating procedure.

6.2

Challenges for Implementation of DSM

Several challenges for implementation of domestic vessel safety are:
(a)

Tight budget of the government to establish adequate means of acces for
every port ;

(b)

Insufficient number of workforces in the government to establish monitoring
team;

(c)

Interest of government on other prioritized areas ;

(d)

River boundary changed due to mining and deforest which may effect to
navigable marking along the river;

(e)

Draft variation due to expansion of delta region by settlement from the
upriver;

(f)

Too many archipelagos at the mount of rivers;

(g)

Traditional ship design travelling to shallow water is dangerous;

(h)

Shipowners consider safety as an unnecessary means, only target to gain
profit which may threaten for capsizing due to overcrowding; and

(I)

Insufficient designated service provider for all maritime appliances.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
The relationship between particular accident types and human element components
was investigated using correspondence analysis, and it was discovered that
groundings and collisions were closely linked to the ship's master. In contrast,
mechanical failures and fires were linked to engine officers, and cargo changes and
flooding were linked to bridge officers. (Tzannatos, E.2010). The investigation into
these accidents has found a minimal technical contribution in such accidents;
however, a lot of human and organizational influence for safety is not solely
dependent on the onboard ship but also on the natural environment, socio-technical,
and economic factors. Therefore, the Department of Marine Administration (DMA)
ensures that the ships and companies comply with the safety management manual
for safe worthy. The compliance requirement for all marine environment operations
should be met with safety standards, the proper procedure for survey and certification,
and permit for operation (AMSA,2020). However, the fly of the Myanmar flag for the
international voyage is only ten general cargo vessels, and about 4000 vessels are
trading

along

the

coastal

and

inland

waterway.

Consequently,

effective

implementation of domestic safety management system in Myanmar is vital of
administrative responsibility. Therefore, should not wait for an accident to happen,
and continuous upgrading the safety culture of all stakeholders align with technical
progress. Additionally, regular safety inspections and audits will enhance domestic
safety management and learn from previous accidents investigation and contribution
factors, then proceeding to the zero fatalities era. Smithsonian Institute states that
"We hardly give the maritime activity a second thought, yet we all depend on the
vessels, ports, and workers who keep those global maritime connections going".
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Appendix 1

- WNU Research Ethics Committee Protocol 63
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Appendix 2

- Consent to interview
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Appendix 3

- Interview Questions

(1) Please describe your specific role and involvement in Domestic Shipping in
Myanmar.
(2) Please share your experience with accidents in the Domestic fleet of Myanmar.
Have you experienced accidents yourself? What trends do you see?
(3) What is your view regarding the accidents on domestic ships? Why are these
accidents happening?
(4) When you look at accidents on domestic ships in Myanmar, what are the most
common causes? Groundings, capsizing, fire, flooding and how are they caused
people falling asleep, other violations etc.?
(5) What are the precondition of unsafe acts leading to accidents in Domestic
shipping? Lack of training, overloading or ignoring procedures and regulations could
be examples in this respect.
(6) Could you provide any discussion to enhance Domestic safety standards relate
to crew condition and environmental factors?
(7) Can you give us some ideas on how to effectively supervise for safe onboard
conditions? Can this be achieved by a shore-based safety management system?
(8) Could you please share your views in relation to organizational climate, process
and management factors in the domestic fleet of Myanmar and how they influence
the safety in domestic shipping?
(9) What are the general challenges for implementing safety standards in the
Domestic fleet?
(10) Do you have any idea what is the best way to approach a safety management
system/ atmosphere?
(11) Do you have any additional suggestions for Domestic Safety Management
System?
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Appendix 4 – Google drive link for the lists of domestic vessel accident in
Myanmar between 2010 to 2020

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1IQCzejO1OgVPcEs0b
WvXmRxckcghZjNB/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=1000687150478513
13878&rtpof=true&sd=true
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Appendix 5

- Coding HFACS analysis retrieved from investigation reports.

The analysis has been taken from the internal document of DMA and retrieved from
twenty accident investigation reports for the Domestic shipping sector.

1. M.V "MALACCA HIGHWAY" & M.T “MYAN AUNG”
General Information
Accident no.: 1
Date: 28/04/2013

M.V MALACCA HIGHWAY

MT MYAN AUNG

Length:

139 m

Length :

Breadth :

23 m

Breadth : 10 m

Depth :
GT:

63 m

Depth :
17735

DWT : 1118

Engine Power :

Engine Power :

Built :

Built : 1965

1996

Falg & Class : Panama /

Owner & Operator: Myanmar ?

Owner :
Dead / Missing

Dead / Missing : Sinking

72

Injury

Injury

Type of Vessel: Car Carrier (F.G) & Tanker (Coastal)

Type of Accident: Collision
Accident time: 14:50 hr
Location: Yangon River
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 23rd of April 2013, a car carrier, Malacca
Highway, approached anchorage with a pilot onboard. While underway, the pilot
tried to contact MT Myan Aung, a coastal tanker sailed with the tide but no reply.
The captain raised the whistle tried to announce the Tanker vessel at a distance of
about 0.3 N-miles. About 14: 45 hours, the pilot ordered to master of the Tanker
vessel to change course via VHF radio. After that master of the tanker vessel
responded that he had been ordered to alter starboard and refused to alter again to
port. The pilot ordered to stop the engine and full astern; however, two vessels
collided on 14: 50 hours in the position of 16` 35.49” N, 096` 14.8” E.

( UNSAFE ACTS )
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

No proper watch- keeping on the Tanker vessel
AE108

Negative habit
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Improper look out
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 204 Necessary action - delay
Radio communication was delayed
Perceptual errors AE 300
AE 301 Error due to misperception
Master of Tanker ship maintain the course

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Tidal affect
Personal Factors
Crew interaction PP 100
PP106

Communication critical information

First-order was hard the starboard then ordered course to port given by pilot to
tanker master
PP111 Miscommunication
Conflict information
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
Inadequate training for COLREG 72
Crew Condition
Cognitive factors PC 100
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PC103 Confusion
Confuse between first and second-order
PC111 Overaggressive
Tanker master refused to alter course to port
PC114 Response set
Lack of flexibility for problem-solving
PC119 Misinterpreted/ misread instrument

( Unsafe Supervision )
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 001

Leadership / supervision/ oversight inadequate

The improper watch-keeping system established
SI 005

Supervision - personal conflict

Lack of guidance for conflict with outer source (ship to ship)
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 004 Limited total experience
Poor knowledge for COLREG 72
SP 005 Proficiency
Lack of proficiency
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Shipborne related shortcoming SF 000
SF 005 Failed to update manual
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Inland steam vessel act and other old regulations were not in line with COLREG
72

( Organizational Influences )
Resource management
Human resources OR 000
OR 003 Training
Collision avoidance training align with COLREG 72
Organizational process OP XXX
Procedure OP 100
OP 103 Procedural guidance / publications
No clear collision avoidance rule has been published
OP 104 Informational resources / support
Improper IALA buoyage system (Region A)
Oversight OP 200
OP 202 Established safety programs/risk management programs
No VTS centre
OP 203 Monitoring and checking of resources, climate and process to
ensure a safe work environment
No AIS equipment on the coastal ship
Statutory
International / national standards FS 000
FS 002 Regulations
Inland steam vessels act out of date
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2. MV Panja Bhum , Zwe Myint Myat Tun 3
General Information
Accident no.: 2
Date: 26/04/2015
Type of Vessel: Container (F.G) & Tug
Type of Accident: Collision

MV Bangpakaew

Zwe Myint Myat Tun 3

Length:

147.8 m

Length:

95’ 6”

Breadth :

24.43 m

Breadth :

21’ 6”

Depth : 86’ 10”

Depth :
GT:

4796

GT : 85.27

Engine Power :

Engine Power : 260x 2

Built :

Built

2008

Falg & Class : Singapore

2005

Owner & Operator: U Khin Maung
Shein

Owner :
Dead / Missing

Nil

Dead / Missing
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Injury

Nil

Injury Nil

Hull damage

Total Loss

Accident time: 15:03 hour
Location: Yangon River
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 26th of April 2015, container vessel Panja Phum
collided with an inland tug, Zwe Myint Myat Tun 3, due to bad weather. There was
no proper lookout duty on both vessels and no VHF radio provided on the Inland
tug. Master and pilot from container ship ignore the safe speed, and inland tug
master violated the inland vessel rule ( sail to the right side as far as possible ).

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE108

Negative habit

The vessel operates without VHF radio
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV406

Violated standing orders and regs

Violate rule 6,7 and 8 (COLREG 72) Safe speed, available all means and reduce
speed
Exceptional AV 500
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AV 502

Accepted unnecessary hazards

Proceed voyage with full speed during poor visibility

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE102

Artificial light

Poor visibility due to bad weather
Technological environment PE 200
PE204

Communication equipment

Lack of VHF radio on the inland tug
PE205

Barriers

Communication breakdown
Personal Factors
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
Improper trained Pilot and tug master for collision avoidance regulation

Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 014

Loss of supervisory situational awareness

Ignore poor visibility
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
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SP 003 Limited recent experience
Lack of safety awareness during Monsoon climate
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
No specific guidelines and procedures for inland vessels operating in the Yangon
River
SV 003 Violate procedures
Tug master violated the inland vessel rule ( Sail to the right side as far as possible
).

Organizational Influences
Organizational process
Oversight OP 200
OP 202 Established safety programs/risk management programmes
Not establish the Vessels Traffic Management System
Statutory
International / national standards FS 000
FS 002 Regulations
No specific order and regulation regarding with communication arrangement
between inland vessels and sea gong ship

3. Yazar Tun
General Information
Accident no.: 3
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Date: 31/10/2015
Type of Vessel: Ferry
Type of Accident: Capsizing
Accident time: 05:30
Location: Long Grate Swirl, Gazatte village, Kalaywa, Sagaing Division
Involved:
Length: 100’ 03”
Breath: 11’00”
Depth: 2’8”
GT:

- Unregistered vessel

Engine Type & Power:
Build: 2012
Owner & Operator: Registered owner U Aung Thu Sint
Dead / Missing : 14 / 25
Injury: -

4

Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
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Summary of the accident: The unregistered ferry, Yarzar Tun , has been controlled
by the uncertified operator who departed from Monywa jetty on 31st October 2015,
13:00 hour, and arrived at Thintaw village about 20:00 hour. Then, proceeded to
Kalaywa about 21:00hour and arrived at 13:00 hour on the first of November. After
that, morning 04: 00 hour on the same day ferry departed from Kalaywa jetty and
about 05:30 hour, and the ferry capsized during passing through the confluence.

( UNSAFE ACTS )
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

the wrong way from the normal lane and proceed to swirl
Perceptual errors AE 300
AE 301 Error due to misperception
Passing through the confluence without reducing speed
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV403

Operated when unauthorized

Uncertified operators

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE102

Artificial light

Poor visibility
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Heavy swirl
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Personal Factors
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
Operators were not proper trained for driving the ferry
PP203 Time constraints
Departure time was 04:00 hour
Crew Condition
Cognitive factors PC 100
PC123 Alertness (drowsiness)
Morning 05: 30 hour
Physiological state PC 200
PC204

Physical fatigue

Driver runs the ferry for the whole night without assistance

( Unsafe Supervision )
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 001

Leadership / supervision/ oversight inadequate

Gate officer failed to report vessel monitoring team for unregistered vessel
SI 006

Supervision - lack of feedback

Allow running night time
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 003 Limited recent experience
Emerging high swirl on 4th and 5th day of every month
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SP 004 Limited total experience
Change of navigational way due to nature of Chindwin river
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
Uncertified operators
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
Night time running
SV 005 Willful disregard of authority
Unregistered vessel

( Organizational Influences )
Resource management
Human resources OR 000
OR 001 Inadequate safe manning
Driver runs ferry for the whole night without assistance
Organizational Climate
Structure OC 000
OC 005 Formal accountability for action
Vessel association allowed to run for unregistered vessel
Policies OC 100
OC 104 Accident and incident investigation
The same case happened on 2001
Culture OC 200
OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
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The vessel association and monitoring team only focused on monetary
penalties.
Organizational process
Operation OP 000
OP 004 Schedules
Vessel monitoring office open from 6 am to 6 pm, and ferries run 24 hour
Oversight OP 200
OP 203 Monitoring and checking of resources, climate and process to
ensure a safe work environment
Lady gate -officer lack of vision for safety aspect and did not manage owners
and masters.

4. Shwe Thiha (Aung Soe Moe Kyaw 2)
General Information
Accident no.: 4
Date: 15/10/2016
Type of Vessel: Ferry
Type of Accident: Capsizing and Sinking
Accident time: 04:45
Location: Mi Chaung Twin village, Monywa, Sagaing Division
Involved:
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Length: 120’ 11”
Breath: 13’15”
Depth: 3’1”
GT:

40

Engine Type & Power: Mitsubishi & 216 BHP
Build: 2013 (Myanmar)
Owner & Operator: Original Registered owner (U San Win) / Actual owner (U
Htay Zaw & U Myint Kyaw)
When the ship was sold out: 28.12.2015
Dead / Missing : 73 / 41
Injury: Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: Maximum design limit to carry passengers was 86, and
Administration permitted only 36 persons. About (10:00) hr on (14.10.2016), Shwe
Thiha vessel departed from Homemalin City and carried with an estimated passenger
about 180 and various goods. At (04: 45)hr on ( 15.10.2016), near Michaungtwin
village, the western bank of Chindwin River, the vessel capsized due to overturning
the steering because the driver tried to return back to normal water way from the
wrong direction which directed to the river bank.

( UNSAFE ACTS )
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ERRORS
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 203 Necessary action - rushed
Overturned steering while trying to get back into the right way
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV406

Violated standing orders and regs

To proceed with an overcrowded and overloaded ship.

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
.
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Sand Bank
Night time
No aid to navigation
Personal Factors
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
Crew Condition
Cognitive factors PC 100
PC108 Overconfidence
PC110

Complacency (reduce consciousness due to overconfidence and

undermotivation
Run the vessel without proper navigational assistance with overloaded conditions
and nighttime
Physiological state PC 200
PC204

Physical fatigue

The driver got fatigued, and sleepiness when handling the vessel for over 20 hours
continuously.
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( Unsafe Supervision )
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 001

Leadership / supervision/ oversight inadequate

Gate Officer, they only know the number of tickets and do not inspect and check
the actual boarding passenger list
SI 004

Supervision - policy

Lack of supervising for prohibited during night time
SI 006

Supervision - lack of feedback

There was no action taken by the vessel monitoring team even though the
passenger has been reported to office staff, U Mya Than Tun.
SI 008

Failed to provide an adequate rest period

The vessel was run the whole night by the driver, Zaw Myo Win, with the GPS
data
SI 009

Lack of accountability

There was no vessel inform to the team, and they did not monitor and inspect on
the ground.
There is no safety enforcement will achieve without the participation of marine
police and the general administration department.
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 009 Failed to provide adequate opportunity for crew rest
The driver handover to one of the crew while having food time only, and the crew
has no certificate for driving the vessel
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Shipborne related shortcoming SF 000
SF 004 Failed to report unsafe tendencies
There was a lot of passengers and cargo onboard, and some passengers
embarked on the roof of the vessel
Nobody reported the condition of cargo on top by the modified roof then loaded
over the assigned freeboard.
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Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
Shwe Thiha vessel was owned by U Zaw Zaw and U Myint Kyaw, run with expert
drivers but without certificates due to lack of certified persons.
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
Ferries run at night time, and for this condition, no monitoring team reported to the
divisional government, and nobody cared for this case.
SV 005 Willful disregard of authority
The divisional government prohibited running at night; however, Aye Nyein Chan
Thar association ran their vessel during the night
All other vessel associations have not followed this instruction.

( Organizational Influences )
Resource management OR
Human resources
OR 001 Inadequate safe manning
There were not enough certified drivers for all vessels where running along the
Chindwin river
OR 003 Training
No training and drill exercise to prevent all accidents, especially before the festival,
long length of public holiday and vacation time
Equipment/facility resources OR
OR 202 Acquisition policies/design process
To be modified the roof design with tarpaulins to prevent passengers and cargoes
carried on top
Organizational Climate OC
Structure OC
OC 003 Accessibility/visibility of supervisor
Thar vessel association had 27 vessels and ran one vessel per day. Therefore, the
vessel had not been notified during the surprised check and expired the certificate
was not reported from port security and monitoring committee
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The divisional transport department and general administration department have
participated two times only and then no more join this committee.
OC 005 Formal accountability for action
The chairman assigned gate officers to sell the ticket only not over the passenger
limit and no additional duty
Culture OC 200
OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
Aye Nyein Chan Thar association run their vessel during the night because all other
vessel associations did not follow the instruction for sailing prohibited at night time
Organizational process
Oversight OP 200
OP 201 Doctrine (philosophy of risk acceptance lead to an unsafe situation)
Enforcement was poor due to conflict of interest because the most of vessel
monitoring team members run their owned the vessels
OP 203

Monitoring and checking of resources, climate and process to

ensure a safe work environment
Expired the certificate was not reported from port security and monitoring
committee
Statutory FS
International / national standards FS 000
FS 002 Regulations
A major weak point of the private vessel monitoring rule developed by the Sagaing
divisional government was monetary penalties only.
Flag state implementation FS 100
FS 103 Class and statutory surveys
overdue for dry docking
FS 104 Communication
On (28.12.2015), sold to U Htay Zaw and U Myint Kyaw under a mutual sales
agreement, but the owner's name on the vehicle registration certificate was not
change and registered in administration as the previous owner
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5. Pathein Thu 15 , Chan Myae Tun 2
General Information
Accident no.: 5
Date: 19/12/2016
Type of Vessel: Ferry & Wooden cargo boat
Type of Accident: Collision
Accident time: 17:00 hr
Location: Toe River (Kyie Htaw )
Pathein Thu 15

Chan Myae Tun 2

Length: 162’

Length :

36’

Breadth :
Depth :
GT:

Breadth :

6’3”

Depth :

162.31

GT :

Engine Power : 500 BHP

Engine Power :

Built :

Built

2012

Falg & Class :

Owner & Operator:

Owner : U Aung Myint
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Dead / Missing

Nil

Dead / Missing

Injury

Nil

Injury

Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 19th December 2016, Inland ferry, Pathein Thu
15, collided with a wooden boat, Chan Myae Tun 2, at the Wae Gyi curve, Toe
River. The ferry sailed against the tide and proceeding from starboard lane with
reduce speed. However, the Wooden boat suddenly turned and crossing over the
ferry; consequently, the wooden boat entered into the twin-hull of the ferry then
sunk.

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE108

Negative habit

Crossing over the larger vessel
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 206 Wrong decision making during operation
Suddenly turned

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres
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Limited visibility due to cure of river
Technological environment PE 200
PE204

Communication equipment

No additional communication equipment fitted on both vessels instead of VHF
Personal Factors
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
No safety training and awareness program for the boat driver
Crew Condition
Physiological state PC 200
PC219 Insufficient reaction time
Crossed over with full speed

Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 003

Local training issues/programs

No safety training and awareness program for the boat driver
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 004 Limited total experience
Lack of experience for passing the curve of the river
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
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Expired boat license

Organizational Influences
Organizational Climate
Culture OC 200
OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
Traditional practice lead to an accident

6. MV Anan Bhum and MV Htet Aung Lin 1
General Information
Accident no.: 6
Date: 01/03/2017
Type of Vessel : Container (F.G) & Cargo (Coastal)
Type of Accident: Collision
Accident time: 05:00 hr
Location: Yangon River
MV Anan Bhum

MV Htet Aung Lin 1

Length:

146 m

Length :

Breadth :

22 m

Breadth :

Depth :

Depth :

94

GT:

9675

GT :

Engine Power :

Engine Power :

Built :

Built

1996

Falg & Class : Thailand / DNV- GL

Owner & Operator:

Owner : RCL
Dead / Missing

Dead / Missing

Injury

Injury

Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 1st March 2017, container vessel Anan Bhum
departed from Yangon (NEA) anchorage and coastal vessel Htet Aung Lin 1
proceeded to Yangon in the current. On the morning of about 04:20, the master from
Htet Aung Lin called Anan Bhum via VHF channel 16 and reduced speed due to no
reply from the Container ship. Myanmar pilot controlled Anan Bhum, and Thailand
captain and Htet Aung Lin handled the coastal master who holds the pilot exemption
permit. All navigation and manoeuvring equipment was satisfactory, and at about
05:00 hour, the two vessels collided during the port to port passing.

( UNSAFE ACTS )
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

95

No person has been assign for proper look out on container ship
AE108

Negative habit

The pilot was unwilling to reply to other small coastal ships when calling from a
radio
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 204 Necessary action - delay
The pilot commenced action 24 seconds before collided
AE 206 Wrong decision making during operation
Coastal vessel waiting order from a larger container ship
Perceptual errors AE 300
AE 301 Error due to misperception
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV404

Violated training rules

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE102

Artificial light

Limited visibility (04:45 hour)
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Proceeding with/against the current
Technological environment PE 200
PE204

Communication equipment

Failed contact with another form of communication system
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Personal Factors
Crew interaction PP 100
PP104

Rank gradient/power distance

Inland masters perform piratical exercises under the supervision of pilots to get a
pilot exemption permit
PP111 Miscommunication
No agreement has been taken before crossing each other
Personal readiness PP 200
PP203 Time constraints
Bound to and from Yangon with tidal schedule due to draft limit
PP204

Pattern of poor risk judgement

Container master failed to assign additional look out during limited visibility
Crew Condition
Cognitive factors PC 100
PC108 Overconfidence
The pilot commands the vessel without look out
PC123 Alertness (drowsiness)
Morning (05:00 Hour)
PC124 Peer pressure
Inland master called container ship two times only
Physiological state PC 200
PC204

Physical fatigue

The container ship just passed with five larger ships, and the Pilot ordered and
communicated with others pilots and crew.
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( Unsafe Supervision )
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 004 Limited total experience
Coastal vessel proceed with left bounded in Yangon river
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 003 Violate procedures
The pilot did not order for proper lookout

Organizational Influences
Organizational Climate OC
Structure OC
OC 001 Chain - of - command
Container master failed to take necessary action
OC 002 Communication
No communication between container master and pilot
OC 004 Delegation of authority / rigidity
Container master considered that no additional command need after the pilot
onboard
OC 005 Formal accountability for action
Nobody informed to pilot to reply via VHF
Culture OC 200
OC 201 Norms and rules
Pilots influence over all inland and coastal masters
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Organizational process
Operation OP 000
OP 003 Time pressure
Proceed with tidal schedule
Procedure OP 100
OP 104 Informational resources / support
No facilitation of VTS centre

7. Nadi Shwe Sin , Ngwe Kyal Pwint
General Information
Accident no.: 7
Date: 07/04/2017
Type of Vessel : Tug & Under 20 H.P ferry
Type of Accident: Collision
Accident time: 19:0 hour
Location: Ngawon River, Pathein

Nadi Shwe Sin

Ngwe Kyal Pwint

Length:

97’09 “

Length :

Breadth :

23’04”

Breadth :

Depth :

07’11”

Depth :

GT:

87.39

52’
10’09”
03’

GT :

Engine Power : Hino V22C (250x 2 H.P)

Engine Power : 18 H.P

Built :

Built
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Owner: U Thein Htay
Dead / Missing

Dead / Missing 31

Injury

Injury

Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 7th April 2017, at about 19:00 hours, a small
ferry boat departed from Pathein jetty with 59 persons onboard that was twice the
allowable limit and some passengers seated on the roof. There was no navigational
or signal light and life-saving appliance onboard. A few minutes after departure, a
small ferry boat collided with a tug and barge when passing through the curve of
Ngawon River.

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

overtaking to the larger vessel
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 204 Necessary action - delay
Delay action for the rescue operation
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV403

Operated when unauthorized

Uncertified boat driver

100

AV406

Violated standing orders and regs

Improper navigation light on small boat and barge
Not carried life-saving appliance as per Inland vessel law (Reg. 30)
Exceptional AV 500
AV 501

Exceeded limits of a system

Carried twice of allowable passenger limit
AV 504

Unauthorized to operate beyond design criteria

The passengers seated on the roof

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE102

Artificial light

Poor visibility during sunset
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Tug and barge sailed with full loaded which may affect the momentum of vessel
Technological environment PE 200
PE204

Communication equipment

Failed to blast with ship whistle while passing the narrow and dense area

Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 001

Leadership / supervision/ oversight inadequate

The vessel monitoring team did not inspect the overloaded boat before departure
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SI 009

Lack of accountability

General administration department issue license for ply without checking any
safety requirement
SI 011

Failed to track qualification

Boat owner allowed to operate with an uncertified driver
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
Uncertified driver
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
Lack of order for the small boats to operate during day time only

Organizational Influences
Organizational Climate
Structure OC 000
OC 005 Formal accountability for action
Local general administrative departments issue licenses without following the
registration guidelines
Culture OC 200
OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
Small boats operate in a rural area without carried or insufficient life jacket
Organizational process
Oversight OP 200
OP 203 Monitoring and checking of resources, climate and process to
ensure a safe work environment
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Lack of monitor and reporting procedure of vessel and cargo on every jetty

8. RV Poukan
General Information
Accident no.: 8
Date: 01/08/2017
Type of Vessel : River Cruise
Type of Accident: Fire
Accident time: 21:50
Location: Gawine jetty, Mandalay
Length: 188’
Breath: 40’
Depth: 12’
GT:

14.6

Engine Type & Power: Cummins (425 x 2 BHP)
Build : 2014
Owner & Operator: U Than Oo
Dead / Missing : Nil
Injury: - Nil
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: During under repairing process, the cruise dock at
Gawain jetty, Mandalay power supply from shoreside. On the evening of 1st August
2018, about 09:30 hours, the fire broke out from repaired room after regain from the
shore power supply due to surge voltage and short circuit. There was no fire petrol
arrangement and switch off the power of sprinkler and fire main system due to
voltage variation (220 ~ 440 v). Fire has been killed by portable extinguisher after
the 60 minutes, as a result, diminished one cabin.
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UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

No safety in charge during repaired
AE108

Negative habit

Switch off power of fire fighting equipment

Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 001

Leadership / supervision/ oversight inadequate

No fire petrol arrangement
SI 003

Local training issues/programs

Lack of training for using BA set and fire man out fit
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 008 Failed to provide adequate brief time/supervision
No counter checking system
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 003 Violate procedures
No fire petrol or watch keeping arrangement during repaired time
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Organizational Influences
Resource management
Technological resources OR 100
OR 101 Excessive cost-cutting
Shore power supplied only for 220 v, and harbour generators do not supply fire
pumps.
Organizational process
Oversight OP 200
OP 203 Monitoring and checking of resources, climate and process to
ensure a safe work environment
Improper safety management system

9. MV Bangpakaew , MFV Phyo Pwint Maung / Lin Yaung Thit 4
General Information
Accident no.: 9
Date: 29/08/2017
Type of Vessel: Container (F.G) & Fishing
Type of Accident: Collision
Accident time: 19:15 hour
Location: Yangon River
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MV Bangpakaew

MFV Phyo Pwint Maung / Lin
Yaung Thit 4

Length:

98.5 m

Length :

Breadth :

18 m

Breadth :

Depth :

Depth :

GT:

4796

GT :

Engine Power :

Engine Power :

Built :

Built

1998

Falg & Class : Thailand

Owner & Operator:

Owner :
Dead / Missing

Nil

Dead / Missing

NIl

Injury

Nil

Injury

Nil

Hull damage

Total loss

Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 29th of August 2017, container vessel,
Bangpakaew departed from Yangon against the tide and fishing vessel Phyo Pwint
Maung was towed with Lin Yaung Thit due to engine damage. Both fishing vessels
proceed to Yangon with the. About 19:07, the Pilot from the Container ship informed
that “Port-to-Port crossing” via VHF radio. Meanwhile, the Fishing vessel did not

106

reply due to VHF malfunction. After eight-minute, Fishing vessels altered the course
to port immediately due to steering malfunction; consequently, collided with the
starboard bow of a container ship and sunk the fishing vessel, Lin Yaung Thit 4, due
to hull damage and flooding.

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

Sudden alternation, of course
AE108

Negative habit

Over-reliance on VHF radio rather than collision avoidance action
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV403

Operated when unauthorized

Both skippers from fishing vessels operated without a competency certificate
AV404

Violated training rules

Failure to consider that the vessel against the tide should give privilege to the
vessel with the tide in a narrow channel

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Both vessels proceed the voyage with and against the current
Technological environment PE 200
PE204

Communication equipment

Malfunction of VHF radio
Personal Factors
Crew interaction PP 100
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PP111 Miscommunication
Notified by blowing with the whistle and fishing vessel did not understand the signal
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
Lack of sufficient training for the ship to ship communication

Unsafe Supervision
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
There was no shipper onboard and controlled by assistant skippers who did not
have the certificate
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
Lack of law enforcement regarding monitoring for operating the vessel without
necessary certificates
SV 003 Violate procedures
Lack of contingency planning

Organizational Influences
Organizational process
Procedure OP 100
OP 104 Informational resources / support
Absent of vessel traffic service

10. Under 20 Horse Power Boat
General Information
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Accident no.: 10
Date: 25/02/2018
Type of Vessel: Ferry
Type of Accident: Capsizing
Accident time: 18:30
Location: Indawgyi Lake, Kachin State
Length: 18’
Breath: 3’06”
Depth: 1’03”
Engine Type & Power: Honda (6 BHP)
Build: 2013 (Myanmar)
Owner & Operator: U Maung Oo
Dead / Missing: Nine
Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 25th February 2018, at about 18:00 hours, an
unregistered small ferry capsized near lwaemon village in the Indawgyi Lake during
bad weather. The small boat was designed for fishing and operated by fishermen
without a driver license and carried passengers for island pagoda during festival
season. According to the design feature, the boat can carry six persons only.
However, 18 passengers were carried before the accident happened and remaining
the freeboard six inches consequently, ingress water and sinking after the strong
wind.

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
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Skill -based errors AE 100
AE108

Negative habit

Negligence of safety and carried overload
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV403

Operated when unauthorized

Operate without driver license
AV406

Violated standing orders and regs

Carried passenger without ferry license
Exceptional AV 500
AV 502

Accepted unnecessary hazards

Most of the passengers onboard were students, and no life-saving appliance was
provided
AV 504

Unauthorized to operate beyond design criteria

Carried more than safe loaded limit

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Bad weather effects on boat steering control
Personal Factors
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
Lack of safety awareness due to uncertified driver
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Unsafe Supervision
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Shipborne related shortcoming SF 000
SF 001 Failed to correct inappropriate/risky behaviour
Water pumping out manually before proceeding the route
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
Uncertified driver
SV 005 Willful disregard of authority
The fishing boat carried passenger

Organizational Influences
Organizational process
Operation OP 000
OP 004 Schedules
Festival season demand overcrowded condition

11. Aung Chan Thar 3
General Information
Accident no.: 11
Date: 26/03/2018
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Type of Vessel: Fishing
Type of Accident: Fire
Accident time: 10:30
Location: Daw Nyein village, Pyarpone, Ayarwaddy Division
Involved:
Length: 44’ 10”
Breath: 13’07”
Depth: 4’9”
GT:

14.6

Engine Type & Power: Nissan FE -6106765 B (148 BHP)
Build: 2013 (Myanmar)
Owner & Operator: Original Registered owner U Naing Soe
Dead / Missing: Nil
Injury: - Nil
Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: Aung Chan Thar 3 was towed by other vessels due to
engine damage. During under repairing process, the vessel dock at Daw Nyein
village. The shipowner and crew brought the old engine to the shore and left the
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vessel without a crew or any watchkeeper. Before leaving the ship, one of the crew
charged the mobile phone with a power bank and lit it with a candle on the shrine in
the engine room. After the fire occurred, all crew fought with portable fire pump
.however, a fire was an uncontrollable condition and led to exploding fuel oil storage
tank. Consequently, it burned out some houses from shore and the whole vessel.
Major root causes were: usage of naked light in the engine room, fuel oil service tanks
made with plastic, and there was no ready to the fire extinguisher and sandbox.

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

the poor practice of hot work and usage of naked flame in machinery space
AE108

Negative habit

use of naked flame and no watch keeper in E/R
AE111

Procedures not used

Impropriate fire fighting procedure
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV401 Violation based on risk assessment
Charging power bank for mobile phone and lighting with the candle in E/R

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Personal Factors
Crew interaction PP 100
PP101

Machinery space leadership

No fire watch during alongside
PP102

Cross- monitoring performance

No counter check before leaving machinery space
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
The crew were not trained for proper fire fighting procedure
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Crew Condition
Cognitive factors PC 100
PC125 Technical/procedural knowledge
Lack of knowledge for oil fire
Physiological state PC 200
PC215 Misplaced motivation
The owner and manager focused the safety after the job satisfaction completion

Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 003

Local training issues / programs

lack of fire fighting training
SI 010

Perceived lack of authority

Poor enforcement to the rural area
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 004 Limited total experience
Lack of knowledge for fire hazard
SP 006 Lack of risk assessment - formal
Traditional working practice is apart from the risk assessment procedure

Organizational Influences
Resource management
Human resources OR 000
OR 003 Training
Fishery associations do not organize to provide proper safety training to their
worker
Organizational Climate
Culture OC 200
OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
lack of safety culture

114

Organizational process
Oversight OP 200
OP 203

Monitoring and checking of resources, climate and process to

ensure a safe work environment
The local fishery association does not notify and monitor for safety awareness to
the owner and crew
Statutory
Flag state implementation FS 100
FS 101 Link with vessel/company
Ship owners and crew do not conduct safety training and seminars hosted by
Administration

12. Shwe Sin Oo
General Information
Accident no.: 12
Date: 13/06/2018
Type of Vessel : Under 20 horse power boat
Type of Accident: Capsizing
Accident time: 13:15
Location: Kawyar village , Homemalin
Involved:
Length:
Breath:
Depth:
GT:
Engine Type & Power:
Build :
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Owner & Operator: Original Registered owner
Dead / Missing : One
Injury: - Nil
Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 13th June 2018, about 13:00 hr, Shwe Sin Oo,
under 20H.P cargo boat, departed from the jetty with cargoes and 25 passengers.
Vessel out of control due to jammed with floating dunnage between propeller and
rudder after 15 minutes departure. After that, the vessel collided with another ship
and sunk.

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 204 Necessary action - delay
Failed to prioritized the collision-avoidance action after steering error
Violation
Routine AV 400
AV403

Operated when unauthorized

Carried passenger without ferry license

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres
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High current and swirl during monsoon season along Chindwin River
Technological environment PE 200
PE206

Faulty equipment

Outboard engine design, combined with propeller and rudder more prone to
failure after jam with floating material

Unsafe Supervision
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 003 Limited recent experience
Lack of experience to recover for any control system failure
SP 004 Limited total experience
Poor awareness for risk of operating during monsoon season
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Shipborne related shortcoming SF 000
SF 001 Failed to correct inappropriate/risky behaviour
Nobody informed or notify to authority for such kind of vessel carried passenger
without permission
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
Local authorities do poor law enforcement

Organizational Influences
Organizational process
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Oversight OP 200
OP 202 Established safety programs/risk management programs
Lack of safety training and program before Monsoon season

13. Cargo Barge ( CBR – 0740 )
General Information
Accident no.: 13
Date: 24/03/2019
Type of Vessel: Cargo Barge
Type of Accident: 7. Cargo Barge ( CBR – 0740 )
Accident time: 16:00 hour
Location: Maw Tin Soon (Lat. 16’ 03.5’(N) & Long 094’ 11.8”
Involved: Tug Lawpan 6

65.84x16.46x3.05M

Length: 65.84 M
Breath: 16.46 M
Depth: 3.05 M
GT:

755

Engine Type & Power of Tug : HINO diesel x 2 & 500 BHP
Build : -
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Owner & Operator: Registered owner U Myo Tun
Dead / Missing : One missing
Injury : One sever injured
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 24th March 2019, about noon, Inland tug, Tug
Lawpan 6 towed with Inland cargo barge which carried ship breaking parts and fuel
oil from wreck removing project near Maw Tin Soon. One hour after departure,
cargo barge flooded from bottom hull where temporary repaired and after another
one more hour, flooded excessively even pumping out. The vessel turns to the port
side for landing on the ground, and water ingress from opened- manholes then
difficult to handle. At about 16:00 hour, cargo barge bumps with rock and sinking.
Tug and Barge were only permitted for inland waterways, and accidents happened
in the coastal area. Barge bottom part bumped with seabed twice per day due to
tidal condition when operating over three months in wreck removal project. Before
departure, damaged bottom parts were repaired temporary only due to insufficient
facilities and resources. Finally, four after departure, the barge flooded, grounded
and sunk.

( UNSAFE ACTS )
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

Opened- manholes
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 204 Necessary action - delay
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Lack of preparing the life-saving appliance before sinking
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV403

Operated when unauthorized

Tug master and engine driver were not certified, person
Exceptional AV 500
AV 501

Exceeded limits of a system

Insufficient Tug power, only 500 BHP cannot properly handle for 1833 DWT
cargo barge in the open sea.
AV 503

Not qualified as engineer officer (driver)

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Barge bumped with sand bed twice a day due to tidal wave during operating three
months in wreck removal project.
Technological environment PE 200
PE209

Inaccessible maintenance area

Insufficient resource for repairing bottom part

( Unsafe Supervision )
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 014

Loss of supervisory situational awareness
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Without necessary action for evacuation from the grounded barge
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 006 Lack of risk assessment - formal
loaded full capacity onto bottom damage barge
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Shipborne related shortcoming SF 000
SF 001 Failed to correct inappropriate/risky behaviour
Temporary repaired
SF 002 Failed to correct a safety hazard
Opened- manholes
SF 003 Failed to initiate corrective action
Lack of major repaired before back to sea
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
Lack of coastal experience of master, crew and all workers
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
Inland tug and barge operated in the coastal area

( Organizational Influences )
Organizational Climate
Structure OC 000
OC 005 Formal accountability for action
Culture OC 200
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OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
Lack of safety awareness
OC 203 Safety as a value
No safety standards and procedures were followed
Organizational process
Operation OP 000
OP 001 Operational tempo / workload
Wrack removal process only allows before monsoon season
Oversight OP 200
OP 202 Established safety programs/risk management programs
Lack of systematic arrangement to handle the impact of tidal condition
OP 203 Monitoring and checking of resources, climate and process to
ensure a safe work environment
Lack of preplanning for major repair

14. MV. Htarwara Aharman (ON – 6583 A)
General Information
Accident no.: 14
Date: 25/07/2019
Type of Vessel: Cargo (Coastal) landing Craft
Type of Accident: Capsizing
Accident time: 15:20 hour
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Location: 26 Nautical miles from Pathein lighthouse (Lat. 15’ 43.5’(N) & Long
094’ 38.9. “
Involved:
Length: 59.44 M
Breath: 11.81 M
Depth: 3.66 M
GT:

677

Engine Type & Power: Nissan diesel (3) & 1140 BHP
Build: - 2011 at Shwe Nagar Dockyard
Owner & Operator: Registered owner U Khin Maung Kyaing
Dead / Missing: Five dead and Two missing
Injury: -

-

Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: MV Htarwara Aharman, Coastal landing craft, departed
from Yangon on 24.07.2019 morning 08:00 hour with carried 25,000 packs of
cement and proceeded to Thantwe, Rakhine State. On the 25th July 2019, about
08:00 hour, vessel speed was 3.5 N-mile and away six N-mile from Thuriya
lighthouse. After six hours, about 14:13, seawater ingresses to the main deck
passed over 7 feet of bulwark due to heavy wave with a strong wind from the port
bow. Consequently, two-third of the cement pack from the forecastle moved to the
port side alleyway then all cargo collapsed to the port side after 30 min. The ship
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manager ordered to master to abandon the ship, and after 50 min, the vessel
capsized and sunk.
UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 204 Necessary action - delay
The ship manager ordered to master to abandon the ship after all cargo shifted to
the port side; however, he maintained the vessel for another 50 minutes.
AE 205 Warning ignored
Ignored weather warning for ( 23.07.2019 to 26.07.2019)
VIOLATION
Exceptional AV 500
AV 502

Accepted unnecessary hazards

Master proceed voyage during heavy weather

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Excessive rolling and pitching may lead to cargo shifting
Technological environment PE 200
PE217

Incorrect procedure

Improper cargo lashing and securing arrangement
Personal Factors
Personal readiness PP 200
PP204

Pattern of poor risk judgement
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Failed to change course or proceed to shelter area
Crew Condition
Cognitive factors PC 100
PC108 Overconfidence
Proceed voyage with weather warning
Physiological state PC 200
PC205

Seasickness

( Unsafe Supervision )
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 014

Loss of supervisory situational awareness

Lack of supervision for cargo securing arrangement
SI 015

Lack of communication with company representatives

Shipowner or manager failed to inspect or check before departure
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 004 Limited total experience
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Shipborne related shortcoming SF 000
SF 002 Failed to correct a safety hazard
Failed to counter check before bad weather
SF 003 Failed to initiate corrective action
Failed to change course
Supervisory Violation
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Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 003 Violate procedures
Improper procedure for bad weather preparation
SV 004 Authorized unnecessary hazard
Allowed to proceed voyage during bad weather

( Organizational Influences )
Organizational Climate
Structure OC 000
OC 005 Formal accountability for action
The ship manager failed to order to alter the course
Culture OC 200
OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
Shipowner, manager, master and all responsible person ignored the weather
warning
Organizational process
Oversight OP 200
OP 202 Established safety programs/risk management programs
No risk assessment has been done
OP 203 Monitoring and checking of resources, climate and process to
ensure a safe work environment
Failed to check cargo securing arrangement and lashing tools before departure
Statutory FS
Flag state implementation FS 100
FS 101 Link with vessel/company
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Allowed port clearance during a weather warning

15. Regency 1 with OB 404 & Yokohama 4 with CBR 351, CBR 510
General Information
Accident no.: 15
Date: 17/10/2020
Type of Vessel: Tug with Oil Barge & Tug with Cargo Barges
Type of Accident: Collision
Accident time: 10:30 hour
Location: Tamalo village , Nyaungtone , Hlaing river, Ayarwaddy
Oil Barge (OB – 404)

Regency 1
Length:

121’5’’

Length :

200’

Breadth :

24’9’’

Breadth :

45’

Depth :

8’ 2”

Depth :

10’

GT:

143

Engine Power : Nissan RT10x 2 (500

GT : 636
Engine Power :

BHP)
Built :

2012

Built
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Owner & Operator : Regency Trading

Owner & Operator: Regency Trading

Co.

Co

Dead / Missing

Dead / Missing

Injury

Injury

Yokohama 4

Cargo Barge (CBR –

Cargo Barge (CBR-

510)

0351)

Length:

85’ 00’’

Length :

48.77 M

Length :

53.34 M

Breadth :

17’9”

Breadth :

9.75 M

Breadth :

11.28 M

Depth :

6’5”

Depth :

2.44 M

Depth :

2.44 M

GT:

54.63

GT :

256

GT :

327

Engine

Power

:

HINO

Engine Power :

Engine Power :

Built

Built

Owner : U Maung Maung

Owner : U Maung

Owner:

Win.

Maung Win

Thandarlin

Dead / Missing

Dead / Missing

Dead / Missing

Injury

Injury

Injury

EF750x 2 (500 BHP)
Built :

2002
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Daw

win

Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 17th October 2020, about 10:00 hour, Inland tug
Regency 1 vessel towed against the current with the Oil barge (OB 404) and Inland
tug Yokohama 4 towed with Cargo barges (CBR 510 & 351) were collided at
Pantaing tringle near Tamalo village ,Nyaungtone , Hlaing river. Regency 1 vessel
towed with full speed and communicated to Yokohama 4 via VHF radio before
passing the tringle; however, loss of connection after replied from Yakohama vessel
which manned with uncertified master and engine driver. Both vessels passed the
tringle without continuous communication via radio and collided with an oil barge
and two cargo barges.

( UNSAFE ACTS )
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE103

Failure to see and avoid

No necessary action has been taken after loss of communication
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

Full speed with against the current and not given way for other vessels with the
current
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 204 Necessary action - delay
Too late to reduce speed
AE 206 Wrong decision making during operation
Do not reduce speed after the loss of communication
Perceptual errors AE 300
AE 301 Error due to misperception
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Operators from both vessels considered that safely pass the tringle without
seeing each other
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV403

Operated when unauthorized

Yokohama was operated with an uncertified master and engine driver
Exceptional AV 500
AV 502

Accepted unnecessary hazards

Yokohama vessel towed with overload (two barges)

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

With and Against the current
Technological environment PE 200
PE204

Communication equipment

Communication error due to VHF radio
Personal Factors
Crew interaction PP 100
PP106

Communication critical information

Proceed voyage without agreement between two vessel
PP111 Miscommunication
Miss communication
Personal readiness PP 200
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PP201 Inadequate training
No VHF training has been taken to the uncertified operator from Yokohama
Crew Condition
Cognitive factors PC 100
PC125 Technical/procedural knowledge
Lack of knowledge collision avoidance rule

( Unsafe Supervision )
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 009

Lack of accountability

Yokohama owner assign uncertified operator as a master
SI 013

Over-tasked / untrained officer at management level

Yokohama master has not been trained for radio communication method
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 003 Limited recent experience
Lack of awareness for passing other vessels without seeing each other
SP 007 Authorized unnecessary hazard
Yokohama towed two barges with a full load
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
Run with uncertified crew
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
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Failed to reduce speed and give way to for upstream vessel
SV 004 Authorized unnecessary hazard
Run with the unqualified crew and overloaded

( Organizational Influences )
Resource management
Human resources OR 000
OR 001 Inadequate safe manning
Faile to reassign with new certified operator after signing off certified master and
engine driver
OR 003 Training
Lack of training for collision rules and radio usage.
Technological resources OR 100
OR 101 Excessive cost-cutting
Run with a cheap and unqualified operator
Organizational Climate
Culture OC 200
OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
Lack of safety awareness for collision when operating with untrained person

16. Aung Mingalar 5 ( ON 4702 )
General Information
Accident no.: 16
Date: 19/10/2020
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Type of Vessel: Fishing
Type of Accident: Capsizing
Accident time: 07:30 hour
Location: Layan island, Myeik, Tanintharyi Division
Involved:
Length: 56’24”
Breath: 18’50”
Depth: 31’33”
GT:

59.35

Engine Type & Power: Cummins & 350 BHP
Build: Owner & Operator: Registered owner Daw Hla Sein 6
Dead / Missing: Two missing
Injury: -

Two

Total loss:
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 15th October 2020 vessel returned from the
fishing zone with all fishing nets stored on the starboard side for sheltering due to a
storm warning. On the 19th October 2020, about (07:30), the vessel capsized to
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starboard were stored the fishing net due to strong wind, then sunk two nautical
away from the island.

( UNSAFE ACTS )
ERRORS
Skill-based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

All fishing net stored at starboard side only
AE112

Failed to prioritize attention

improper lashing

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Excessive rolling and pitching due to heavy weather
Personal Factors
Crew interaction PP 100
PP111 Miscommunication
Fial to Alerting all crew during heavy weather
Personal readiness PP 200
PP204

Pattern of poor risk judgement

Continuing the fishing operation after received weather information (15.10.2020)
Crew Condition
Cognitive factors PC 100
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PC123 Alertness (drowsiness)
Two crews were Sleeping during heavy weather
PC125 Technical/procedural knowledge
Lack of knowledge for heavy weather preparation
Physiological state PC 200
PC205

Seasickness

( Unsafe Supervision )
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 001

Leadership / supervision/ oversight inadequate

No clear instruction was given for heavy weather
SI 014

Loss of supervisory situational awareness

Lack of instruction to alert during Heavy weather

( Organizational Influences )
Organizational Climate OC
Culture OC 200
OC 203 Safety as a value
No ordered to proceed shelter as soon as the storm warning
Organizational process
Procedure OP 100
OP 103 Procedural guidance / publications
No procedure was provided for heavy weather
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17. Win Thiri Aung ( Ya Nya Na / Ayar - 1376 )
General Information
Accident no.: 17
Date: 24/10/2020
Type of Vessel: Dredging and sand carrying boat
Type of Accident: Flooding
Accident time: 07:30 hour
Location: Myaungmya, Ayarwaddy Division
Involved:
Length: 67’9”
Breath: 20’00”
Depth: 5’6”
GT:

29

Engine Type & Power: Cummins & 137 BHP
Build: Owner & Operator: Registered owner U Zarni Win & Operator U Win Hlaing
Dead / Missing: One dead
Injury: -

-
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Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: Dredging and sand carrying vessel Win Thiri Aung
carried sand with the overloaded condition and docked at the river bank for waiting
for the low tide. On the 24th October 2020, about (07:30) hour, during low tide,
flooded from stern part and then sunk; as a result, one crew has been drowned
together with vessel and life was loss.

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

No draft measurement and adjust the mooring line
VIOLATION
Exceptional AV 500
AV 501

Exceeded limits of a system

Overloaded condition

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Vessel draft altered with tidal condition
Personal Factors
Cognitive factors PC 100
PC108 Overconfidence
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Sand loaded until the water level reached near the deck line
PC118 Misperception of operational condition
Without adjusting the mooring line
Physiological state PC 200
PC219 Insufficient reaction time
Flooding and sinking within a short period due to weight of sand

( Unsafe Supervision )
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 001

Leadership / supervision/ oversight inadequate

Failed to order assign duty
SI 014

Loss of supervisory situational awareness

Lack of supervision for tidal condition
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 004 Limited total experience
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
Carried with overloaded

( Organizational Influences )
Organizational Climate
Culture OC 200
OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
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Lack of safety awareness

18. Win Win Htet (15284)
General Information
Accident no.: 18
Date: 11/11/2020
Type of Vessel: Cargo (Shallow water)
Type of Accident: Fire
Accident time: 09:45 hr
Location: Five mile away from Monywa , Sagaing Division
Involved:
Length: 132’
Breath: 18’11”
Depth: 4’ 5”
GT:

86

Engine Type & Power: Mitsubishi & 216 BHP
Build : Owner & Operator: Registered owner U Khin Maung Win
Dead / Missing: Nil
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Injury: -

Two

Total loss: No
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 11th November 2020, about (09:45) hr, shallow
water cargo vessel Win Win Htet fired onboard during sailing Monywa to Namptaw
. The initial source of the fire was an overheated socket of battery charging unit in
engine room then the fire spread out to fuel oil level gauge which provided with
plastic. There was no watchkeeper in the engine room and consequently did not fight
in time, leading to vessel fire. Additional contribution factors were
1. Engine starting and speed was controlled from navigation bridge located at foremost
part ;
2. The old age of wiring system and not industrial standard ;
3. The certified engine driver was only mentioned in the crew list, and no certified engine
driver or oiler actually worked onboard; and
4. The vessel was driven by the shipowner, U Khin Maung Win whose certificate has
been expired even though, in the crew list, the master was another person and he
who not working onboard.

( UNSAFE ACTS )
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE101

Inadvertent use of equipment control and switches
The old age of wiring system and not industrial standard

AE108

Negative habit
Cleanness of engine room

Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 201 Risk assessment during operation
Run without engine room watchkeeper
AE 204 Necessary action - delay
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Lack of knowledge for emergency response procedure
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV403

Operated when unauthorized

No certified master and vessel was driven by shipowner who holds expired
certificate)
AV404

Violated training rules

Exceptional AV 500
AV 503

Not qualified as engineer officer (driver)

The certified engine driver was only mentioned in the crew list

( Preconditions for unsafe acts )
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE101

Temperature - thermal stress

Overheated from the battery charging socket
PE103

Vibration

loosen connection due to vibration
PE105

Toxins and cleanliness in machinery space

Oily in the engine room
Technological environment PE 200
PE201

Control and switches

The old age of wiring system and not industrial standard
Oil level gauge used with plastic
PE203

Machinery space layout

Navigation bridge at foremost part and engine room at aftermost part
PE206

Faulty equipment

Loosen socket
Personal Factors
Crew interaction PP 100
PP101

Machinery space leadership
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No engine driver or oiler onboard
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training

( Unsafe Supervision )
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 004 Limited total experience
The shipowner who manages the vessel holds the temporary license for the
Chindwin River only and already expired
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Shipborne related shortcoming SF 000
SF 001 Failed to correct inappropriate/risky behaviour
Use of loosening socket
SF 002 Failed to correct a safety hazard
Maintenance of engine room cleanness and renewed old electric wire
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
No certified engine roof staff
SV 002 Failed to enforce rules / regs
SV 005 Wilful disregard of authority
SV 006 Inadequate documentation
Crew list did not match with the actual onboard
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( Organizational Influences )
Resource management
Human resources OR 000
OR 001 Inadequate safe manning
No engine room staff
OR 003 Training
Lack of training for emergency response
Technological resources OR 100
OR 101 Excessive cost-cutting
The owner does not want to expanse additional costs for certified operators
Equipment / facility resources OR 200
OR 201 Engineer support
OR 206 Poor engine - room machinery design
Vibrated engine room
OR 207 Purchasing of unsuitable equipment
Usage of electric cable with home appliance standard
Organizational Climate OC
Culture OC 200
OC 202 Organizational customs, beliefs and attitudes
Lack of knowledge for safety culture
Organizational process
Flag state implementation FS 100
FS 103 Class and statutory surveys
Lack of monitoring for actual and official crew list
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19. MV Kumudra 1
General Information
Accident no.: 19
Date: 27/02/2021
Type of Vessel : Cargo (coastal )
Type of Accident: Grounded and Capsizing
Accident time: 18:35
Location: Myebon , Rakhine State
Length: 53.77 m
Breath: 12.45 m
Depth:
GT: 642
Engine Type & Power: Hino (620 HP)
Build :
Owner & Operator: U Tin Nyein
Dead / Missing : Nil
Injury: - Nil
Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 27th February 2021, about 08:30 hour, Kumudra
1 departed from Kantaung Gyi jetty, Myebon and loaded with 600 tones of
construction rock. About 12:00 hour, Commenced heavy waves and strong wind
from starboard beam together with high tide due to full moon day. The vessel
proceeds voyage with difficult steering control and poor visibility. At about 13:30
hours, the vessel collided with black rock and ran aground, consequently flooded
due to tank damage. Ship crew pumping out with three water pumps and informed
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to ship owner and other vessels. On the 18:00 hour, the vessel cleared from black
rock and capsized to the starboard side. Yadanarwin, a coastal vessel, safely
rescued Master and crew.

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE103

Failure to see and avoid

Lack of pre-planning and weather forecasting before departure
AE105

Poor techniques / seamanship

Failure to proceed the sheltered zone by altering course during bad weather
AE111

Procedures not used

Failure to check echo sounder and to assign proper lookout
Decision and Judgement errors AE 200
AE 204 Necessary action - delay
Failure to change course since bad weather commences
Perceptual errors AE 300
AE 301 Error due to misperception
Failure to choose weather routing, Master, tried to handle alone all operations
without job distribution

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
PE102

Artificial light

Poor visibility
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PE104

Ship movements and manoeuvres

Heavy wind and strong current
Personal Factors
Crew interaction PP 100
PP103 Teamwork delegation
Lack of teamwork ( Master and his assistant did not cooperate during emergency
condition)
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
Lack of knowledge and training for responding in emergency conditions

Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 001

Leadership / supervision/ oversight inadequate

Master tried to operate everything alone ( engine control, steering and lookout)
SI 013

Over-tasked / untrained officer at management level

Over workload on Master due to his assistance did not support him
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 004 Limited total experience
Master, never has been experienced for that course
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
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Unqualified master command the vessel

Organizational Influences
Resource management
Human resources OR 000
OR 003 Training
Lack of training for resource management

20. Toe Myat Annawar
General Information
Accident no.: 20
Date: 28/04/2021
Type of Vessel : Fishing
Type of Accident: Fire
Accident time: 06:00 hour
Location: Lat 17’ 57 (N) ,Long 94’ 00(E)
Involved:
Length:
Breath:
Depth:
GT:
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Engine Type & Power:
Build :
Owner & Operator:
Dead / Missing : Nil
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Injury: - Nil
Total loss: Yes
Source of information about the accident: Investigation Report ( Internal
Document of DMA)
Summary of the accident: On the 28th April 2021, the morning of 06:00 hour, a
fishing vessel Caught fire from the engine room due to electric shock. There was no
certified engine driver onboard and operated with an assistance driver before the
accident happened. Electric shock immersed from loosening socket, plug and poor
wiring system then the fire spread out to fuel and finally the whole vessel has been
destroyed although all crew has been safe.

UNSAFE ACTS
ERRORS AE XXX
Skill -based errors AE 100
AE101

Inadvertent use of equipment control and switches

Loosen socket and plug
VIOLATION
Routine AV 400
AV403

Operated when unauthorized

No certified operators for Engine room
Exceptional AV 500
AV 503

Not qualified as engineer officer (driver)

uncertified assistance engine driver has operated the vessel

Preconditions for unsafe acts
Environmental Factors
Physical environment PE 100
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PE103

Vibration

Source of electric shock happened by vibration and loosened socket
Technological environment PE 200
PE201

Control and switches

Usage of poor quality appliance
Personal Factors
Personal readiness PP 200
PP201 Inadequate training
The crew has not been trained to fight engine room fire

Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision
Shipborne and shore supervision SI 000
SI 008

Failed to provide an adequate rest period

Assign for engine room watchkeeping and maintenance duty with two crew
members only
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Shipborne Operation SP 000
SP 002 Poor crew interaction
Failed to respond immediately for cutting fuel and power source
SP 007 Authorized unnecessary hazard
Allowed electrical switchboard over the fuel oil tank
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Shipborne related shortcoming SF 000
SF 004 Failed to report unsafe tendencies
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Failed to inform for providing new crew after certified engine driver went back
home
Supervisory Violation
Shipborne violation SV 000
SV 001 Engaged unqualified crew
Mater did not manage to engine room crew for sufficient rest

Organizational Influences
Resource management
Human resources OR 000
OR 001 Inadequate safe manning
Assigned two crew members in the engine room for overall job
Technological resources OR 100
OR 101 Excessive cost-cutting
Shortage of engine room crew
Equipment/facility resources OR 200
OR 205 Poor engine - room design
Limited access for the engine room to shut off fuel oil and fight the fire
Organizational process
Operation OP 000
OP 001 Operational tempo / workload
Seasonal demand for operation as per nature of the fishing sector
Procedure OP 100
OP 101 Performance standards
Low crew performance and management due to poor income and low education
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Oversight OP 200
OP 203 Monitoring and checking of resources, climate and process to
ensure a safe work environment
Allowed poor electric wiring system

151

